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ID:
142890
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| Summary/Abstract |
Nearly 30 years after I wrote “US Interests and the Use of Force in the Middle East”, these aphorisms are a good starting point for assessing American interests and policies in the Middle East, including approaches to the use of force. I take some quiet pride that what I wrote back then stands up well – for that era. And in terms of analysis of American interests in the region – mutatis mutandis – it also stands up well, as do the precepts for judging policy alternatives. As of today, criteria for US use of force are close to what I perceived them to be in 1986 – though following two major detours, Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.
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| 2 |
ID:
142889
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| Summary/Abstract |
Many aspects of US relations in the region of the Middle East compete for attention. Recently, the focus has been on US policy towards twin subjects of gripping interest: terrorism and Iran. But at least one aspect needs further review for the simple reason that its essence implies the possibility of national decisions of the gravest important. This is the question of the role of force: whether the United States would use military power in the region and, if so, where and how. The role of force has gained added currency as a subject of enquiry because of the latest developments in US relations with nations of the Middle East. Indeed, when President Ronald Reagan justified his sale of arms to Iran, he did so in terms of that country’s vital interest to the United States. Of course – although the president did not suggest the connection – a ‘vital’ interest implies the willingness, if need be, to use what means may be necessary to secure it. Thus Reagan has properly renewed interest in the possibility that the United States would, indeed, employ force in this troubled region.
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