| Summary/Abstract |
It has become commonplace to describe the Islamic State, also known as ISIS, as a cult. Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir, former Australian prime minister Tony Abbott, US President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry have all used the term, in an apparent attempt to discredit the organisation and strip it of its claim to Islamic credentials. But beyond the label lies a strategic implication: if ISIS is indeed a cult, it cannot be fought as a mere terrorist organisation or a proto-state with territorial ambitions. Cults do not recruit and indoctrinate like other political entities; they do not perform like mere militias on the battlefield; and they follow their own warped logic. Cults are more flexible, more cohesive, more agile and ultimately more challenging than other enemies. Most worryingly, leaving a cult is a difficult endeavour, which means that ISIS returnees are very likely to remain attached to the organisation, regardless of their experience with it. Security services will have to bear ISIS’s cultish characteristics in mind as they work to reduce the threat from the Islamic State.
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