| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
143207
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The main role in these processes belongs to the local ethnopolitical elite (regional heads and their closest circles, business elites, clergy, etc.), who also rely on traditional ethnic institutions, national culture and time-honored practices, another source of influence on the masses. The federal Center has to take into account the interests of the ethnopolitical elites rooted in clan, family, and teip solidarity and realized through informal patron-client relationships. The elite’s closeness and durability are significantly slowing down the democratic processes in the region and interfering with the development of civil institutions.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
146622
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The history of the Somali Armed Forces, principally the army, forms an important part of studying the Somali civil war. Two key themes are evident from 1960: the pursuit of an irredentist agenda beyond reasonable limits, which led to the downfall of Siad Barre’s regime, and the clan divisions and agendas that Barre used to shore up his rule in the 1980s and that have bedeviled the rebirth of the Somali Army in the twenty-first century. With the twentieth-century context covered, and in some places reinterpreted, this article then focuses on the uncertain rebirth of the Somali Armed Forces since 2008, using a host of primary and United Nations official sources. Assistance efforts have been focused on Mogadishu, but limited success has been made in forming truly national armed forces. Future prospects are uncertain, but there are some signs of hope.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|