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ID:
190363
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| Summary/Abstract |
Space capabilities are critical to the global economy, military power, and daily life. For example, the United States’ Global Positioning System enables everything from withdrawing cash from ATM machines to allowing the US military to engage in long-range precision strikes. Satellites facilitate long-distance communications, tracking and predicting weather patterns, verifying compliance with arms control treaties, detecting nuclear launches, and supplying critical Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities for militaries to carry out targeting. Yet with the rise of both state and private space actors, the space domain is becoming increasingly crowded and the risk of accidental collisions is increasing. At the same time, several states are pursuing counterspace weapons—raising the risks of creating highly destructive space debris and increasing the odds of accidental escalation and armed conflict in space and on Earth.
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| 2 |
ID:
143306
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| Summary/Abstract |
The present international standard allows non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to forego safeguards when nuclear material is used in a “non-proscribed military activity,” though no criteria have been established to determine when NNWS can remove naval nuclear material from safeguards. Though at present, only nuclear-armed states possess nuclear submarines, the global nuclear naval landscape may soon change with the advancement of Brazil's fledgling program and the possible precedent it would set for other NNWS. A framework is needed to shore up nuclear security and prevent nuclear material diversion from the nuclear naval sector. Proposed and existing nonproliferation frameworks, including a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and commitments through the nuclear security summits, are insufficient to close this loophole. A Naval Use Safeguards Agreement (NUSA), modeled after the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency, would provide a framework to remove the opacity surrounding nuclear material in the naval sector. Designed for NNWS and encouraged as confidence-building measures for nuclear weapon states, NUSA would explicitly outline those stages in the naval nuclear fuel cycle where safeguards are to be applied and in what context. This viewpoint also further provides direction for targeted research and development in technical naval nuclear safeguards solutions.
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