Query Result Set
SLIM21 Home
Advanced Search
My Info
Browse
Arrivals
Expected
Reference Items
Journal List
Proposals
Media List
Rules
ActiveUsers:611
Hits:19944113
Show My Basket
Contact Us
IDSA Web Site
Ask Us
Today's News
Help
Topics
Tutorial
Advanced search
Hide Options
Sort Order
Natural
Author / Creator, Title
Title
Item Type, Author / Creator, Title
Item Type, Title
Subject, Item Type, Author / Creator, Title
Item Type, Subject, Author / Creator, Title
Publication Date, Title
Items / Page
5
10
15
20
Modern View
BUNTE, JONAS B
(2)
answer(s).
Srl
Item
1
ID:
143323
Local power-sharing institutions and interreligious violence in Nigeria
/ Bunte, Jonas B; Vinson, Laura Thaut
Bunte, Jonas B
Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Summary/Abstract
News reports of clashes between Muslims and Christians in countries such as Nigeria are increasingly common. Yet, interreligious violence erupts only in some communities but not others. Under what conditions does religious identity become the fault line of communal violence? We argue that informal power-sharing institutions on the communal level are essential in shaping the incentives of potential perpetrators. We provide both qualitative and quantitative evidence for our claim that districts in which informal power-sharing agreements exist are less likely to experience interreligious violence. We conducted interviews with community leaders in 38 Nigerian districts to trace the process by which local power-sharing institutions exert influence on actors’ incentives to engage in religious violence. We complement this with quantitative analyses of a new dataset capturing interreligious violence on a subnational level. The analyses show that the overall degree of interreligious violence is significantly lower in districts with power-sharing than in those without. We also identify two causal mechanisms through which informal power-sharing institutions operate. First, these institutions affect the incentives of elites to appeal for cooperation. We show that the rhetoric of elites in districts with power-sharing is significantly more conciliatory. Second, power-sharing affects the general population’s perception of the interreligious tensions. Individuals living in districts with power-sharing institutions are less likely to experience religious diversity as threatening. Local-level informal power-sharing institutions are therefore an important foundation for communal peace and interreligious cooperation.
Key Words
Institutions
;
Nigeria
;
Religious Conflict
;
Power-Sharing
Links
'Full Text'
In Basket
Export
2
ID:
151277
Wage bargaining, inequality, and the Dutch disease
/ Bunte, Jonas B
Bunte, Jonas B
Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Summary/Abstract
The theory of the “Dutch Disease” predicts that income from oil and other natural resources produces negative economic consequences through two different mechanisms. The “Resource Movement Effect” suggests that workers leave manufacturing for higher-paying jobs in other sectors. The “Spending Effect” implies that spending resource wealth domestically leads to exchange rate appreciation. The combination of these processes results in the contraction of the export sector. This article explores how, and why, a country’s institutions may prevent the Dutch Disease before it starts. Incorporating insights from the “Varieties of Capitalism” literature, I find that the Dutch Disease is significantly less severe in countries with a high degree of wage bargaining coordination and with low income inequality. The former interrupts the Resource Movement Effect as it limits workers’ incentives to move out of the tradable sector. The latter moderates the Spending Effect because it prevents appreciation of the real exchange rate.
Key Words
Inequality
;
Wage Bargaining
;
Dutch Disease
Links
'Full Text'
In Basket
Export