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MA, GUANGRONG
(2)
answer(s).
Srl
Item
1
ID:
193759
Lack of nostalgia: Hometown favoritism and allocation of intergovernmental transfer in China
/ Ma, Guangrong
Ma, Guangrong
Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Summary/Abstract
We investigated hometown favoritism among senior provincial officials (SPOs) in China. SPOs include all officials with a vice-governor rank or above in provincial party standing committees and provincial governments. Using a new comprehensive panel of 2381 SPOs, we found that an increase in the number of SPOs born in a city does not increase the fiscal transfers received by the city and does not promote local economic growth. We argue that the absence of hometown favoritism results from the Chinese style of upward-accountability regime, in which provincial officials do not need to please residents in return for votes.
Key Words
China
;
Intergovernmental Transfer
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2
ID:
143366
Springboard into politics: do Chinese entrepreneurs benefit from joining the government-controlled business associations?
/ Ma, Guangrong; Rui, Oliver Meng ; Wu, Yiping
Ma, Guangrong
Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Summary/Abstract
Business associations in authoritarian regimes behave systematically different from their counterparts in democratic regimes. Using a unique dataset of Chinese private firms, this paper examines the impacts of joining the most prominent business association in China, the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC) which was initiated and strongly controlled by the government. We find that ACFIC members have much higher chances to obtain formal political identities, that is, the deputy of People's Congress (PC) or the People's Political Consultative Conference (PPCC). However, ACFIC membership itself cannot help entrepreneurs acquire scarce resources that are controlled by the government. Rather, ACFIC members bear heavier tax burdens and make more informal payments to government officials. These findings suggest that the ACFIC act as a springboard into politics, rather than an effective collective action committee that can bring common benefits to its members or protect members from government predation.
Key Words
Business Associations
;
Political Connections
;
Private Firms
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