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ID:
142302
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| Summary/Abstract |
The author Valerii Zamulin addresses a long-standing controversy concerning the Battle of Kursk: Why was the III SS Panzerkorps much more successful in the south than the Ninth Army’s offensive in the north? The author argues that Vatutin, with the approval of the Soviet high command, opted for a sensible ‘matador’s defense’ by deliberately thinning a section of his front line at the main Oboian’ highway to lure the Germans to attack there and then to weaken and stop the onrushing German ‘bull’ with armored thrusts by the 1st Tank Army and two separate tank corps, plus the 67th Army. Vatutin’s mistake was his belief that these alone would be sufficient to stop the Fourth Panzer Army’s main attack.
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| 2 |
ID:
142303
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The article is devoted to critical analysis of the reasons for the defeat of the Red Army at the beginning of WWII in the pages of university textbooks. It is one of the most complicated and painful problems in Russian historiography. This problem presently gives rise to endless discussions in the historical literature and on the Internet. During the study of this theme, materials from 20 modern textbooks were used by the method of content-analysis. The statistical results are represented in two tables, including 16 reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in summer 1941. At the same time we must emphasize that there are no textbooks that give a full list of reasons. Most of the textbooks continue to repeat the myths of old Soviet historiography about Stalin’s mistakes and his repression against the command staff of the Red Army in 1937–1939 and the sudden attack of the Wehrmacht in June 1941 as the main reasons for the military catastrophe that came down on the USSR in the first months of the Great War. In addition, the textbooks have contradictory data on Soviet and German military forces and weaponry, the numbers of losses, and the economic and human potential on opposite sides. All this casts doubt on the reliability of the data of modern textbooks.
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| 3 |
ID:
142300
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyzes Kazakhstan’s security policy, in particular its main security documents: the Law on National Security, the Military Doctrine, and the Foreign Policy Concept. What does the practical application of these concepts, particularly toward the big actors Russia and China and to international organizations, tell us about Kazakh security policy? Overall, the conceptualized policy is largely reflected in practice. The biggest exceptions are found in the implementation of policy toward Russia. The pressure and possible threats of interference from Moscow form a hindrance for a fully independent foreign security policy by Astana. Furthermore, not military/security related measures but the implementation of political and social-economic reforms is essential to ensure the national security of Kazakhstan.
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| 4 |
ID:
142301
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| Summary/Abstract |
In fall, 1941, the Wehrmacht’s Army Group Center launched its last offensive of the year: Operation Typhoon. It was to destroy the Soviet forces west of Moscow and open the way to the capital. Despite a rapid victory that destroyed three Soviet fronts, the offensive ground to a halt before it could take the city. Soviet memoirists and historians claimed that the resistance of the Red Army caused Operation Typhoon to fail. This claim is dismissed by almost all Western historians, who offer a simple explanation: mud. ‘General Mud’ foiled the Germans, leaving them pinned until mid-November frosts again rendered the ground passable.
Our examination of the fighting in October 1941 and Wehrmacht records has led us to conclude that it was not mud that stopped the Wehrmacht. Mud was a contributing factor to the breakdown of Operation Typhoon, but it was far from the only, or even most important factor.
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