| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines how terrorist alerts and terrorist threats interacted during a period of heightened alert in Europe in late 2010. Taking from game theory the concepts of target transference (by terrorists) and defence races (among states) and using their underlying rationalist logic as a causal mechanism, the article attempts to construct an analytical narrative of the till now unwritten history of this event. In the process, the event serves to test whether the observable implications of theory corresponded to reality in this case. The study finds that during the Euro-alert transference in time was more common than transference of place and that there was more resistance to defence races than theory predicts. The alert itself was only a qualified success; the extent to which it was effective was determined by its combination with other offensive actions. The findings call for more attention to be given to terrorist preferences, inter-temporal transference and its relationship to bandwagoning, and state resistance to defence races with consideration of the role of information.
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