| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
146236
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Decades of scholarship have warned against using historical analogies for policymaking. But the Taliban insurgency appears, on the surface, to confirm the usefulness of historical analogies to the British and Soviet wars in Afghanistan. I review the use of analogies for the war in Afghanistan and argue the analogies were historically unsound and strategically unhelpful. In fact, their effect on policy helped create the conditions for the very insurgency policymakers most hoped to avoid. The Taliban insurgency did not occur because of the presence of too many foreign troops and aid workers, but because there were too few.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
143619
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Historical analogies, and historical reasoning, enable policy-makers to overcome major fundamental difficulties in the process of crisis decision-making. By employing lessons and conclusions from past experience, leaders believe they can avoid future failures and make better choices. This paper identifies, for the first time, the key analogies David Ben-Gurion and other key Israeli policy-makers employed prior to the eruption of the Sinai War of October 1956 and their reasoning. It demonstrates that Ben-Gurion was highly sensitive to historical occurrences, personal, national and international, and exhibited great inclination to engage the crisis with Egypt according to the lessons he drew from it. The analogical framework explains the timing of the offensive against Egypt and its distinct nature.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|