| Summary/Abstract |
Rampant corruption among China’s party members suggests that the existing system of party discipline is too fragile to function effectively. The question now is how the central leadership reinforces party supervision over leading cadres in both government and state firms. The Chinese leadership, after some period of experimentation, has introduced new institutions, named zhongyang xunshizu (central inspection groups), to complement the existing discipline system. This article examines how these central inspection groups complement the existing groups institutionally and normatively, and explores the Chinese Communist Party’s institutional engineering efforts to maintain legitimacy, organizational integrity and sustainability. This article considers these initiatives from the view of institutional complementarity and compensation. Theoretically, the application of institutional complementarity to China’s party discipline inspection should expand the scope of analysis into China’s institutional reform of party discipline. Empirically, the central inspection groups are the least known, but perhaps most significant, direct channel for central supervision of leaders in both local government and key state-owned enterprises. By comparing the rationale and operation of disciplinary inspection commissions (DICs), this article attempts to explain how the central inspection groups complement the supervision of local DICs in terms of scope, structure and methods of control.
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