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ID:
144200
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| Summary/Abstract |
The early Internet witnessed the flourishing of a digitally networked public sphere in which many people, including dissidents who had little to no access to mass media, found a voice as well as a place to connect with one another. As the Internet matures, its initial decentralized form has been increasingly replaced by a small number of ad-financed platforms, such as Facebook and Google, which structure the online experience of billions of people. These platforms often design, control, influence, and “optimize” the user experience according to their own internal values and priorities, sometimes using emergent methods such as algorithmic filtering and computational inference of private traits from computational social science. The shift to a small number of controlling platforms stems from a variety of dynamics, including network effects and the attractions of easier-to-use, closed platforms. This article considers these developments and their consequences for the vitality of the public sphere.
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| 2 |
ID:
187911
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| Summary/Abstract |
We investigate the effect of male corporate managers' physical appearance—classified into unattractive, average-looking, and attractive—on the philanthropic decisions of Chinese listed firms. We find that compared to average-looking managers, those who rated as attractive do not engage more actively in corporate donations. On the contrary, the probability of donating is approximately 5% higher for unattractive managers than for average-looking managers; further, unattractive managers donate 95% more in charitable giving. To explain these findings, we propose a psychological channel through which physical appearance may influence male managers' charitable donations: Because altruistic behaviors may aggrandize individuals, managers conscious of deficits in their own physical attractiveness may engage in prosocial behavior to increase their attractiveness in the eyes of others. We find consistent evidence that the effect of managers' unattractiveness on philanthropic decisions is stronger in firms with weaker corporate governance; further, we find that the positive impact of corporate donation on financial performance observed in firms led by attractive and average-looking managers is substantially weaker in those firms led by unattractive managers
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