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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
143637
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| Summary/Abstract |
The increasing use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) has attracted considerable scholarly attention due to its corrosive effects on US democracy. Drawing on neoclassical realism, this article provides a comparative dimension to the study of the political drivers of military privatisation by analysing contractor support to US and UK operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Domestic political constraints have shaped both US and UK response to the need for more boots on the ground, increasing the propensity to use contractors as a force multiplier in spite of their problematic impact on military effectiveness.
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| 2 |
ID:
143634
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| Summary/Abstract |
Once dismissed by many outside observers, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has undergone an impressive transformation over the past two decades, emerging as one of the world’s premier air forces. As it continues to modernize, it is focused on becoming a ‘strategic air force.’ PLAAF strategists suggest this means it should play a decisive role in protecting Chinese national interests, field modern capabilities commensurate with China’s standing as a major power, and enjoy the institutional status befitting its role as a ‘strategic service,’ an important consideration given the historical dominance of the ground force in China’s military.
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| 3 |
ID:
143636
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| Summary/Abstract |
Authoritarian states are often surprisingly successful counterinsurgents. In particular, authoritarians often repress on a vast scale and inhibit insurgent organization, transfer populations, have excellent intelligence penetration, and can counter war weariness in ways not available to democracies. Authoritarians, however, come to counterinsurgency with many disadvantages. They cannot rely on many of their conscripts. Corruption creates numerous problems, and authoritarian system often inhibits learning. Similarly, the politicized command structure often produces poor officers and discourages initiative. The repression they use often makes future unrest more likely. Finally, authoritarian regimes may find it harder to cut peace deals and win over pro-insurgent populations.
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| 4 |
ID:
143638
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| Summary/Abstract |
The United States has returned to Iraq, this time to combat the Islamic State. President Barack Obama’s strategy to ‘degrade, and ultimately destroy the terrorist group’ faces serious problems due to political obstacles in obtaining Congressional Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) and more importantly because of neglect of the crucial role of private contractors. Although the narrative has changed, and there is no public mention of contractors, they remain central to all that the Department of Defense does in the US and abroad. Suggestions are offered on how their performance can be improved to support President Obama’s strategy.
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| 5 |
ID:
143635
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| Summary/Abstract |
Rather than win hearts and minds, authoritarian counterinsurgency is said to rely heavily on coercion. It has a reputation for effectiveness, if also for its amorality. Still, the research into authoritarian counterinsurgency is surprisingly lacking. By distilling common features from key cases, this article concludes that this approach goes beyond the indiscriminate violence that typically captures the imagination. Like their democratic counterparts but differently, authoritarian regimes also engage in mobilisation, create narratives, and turn military advantage into political gain. The analysis explains how these tasks are undertaken and, by contradistinction, sheds light on more liberal approaches as well.
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