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| 1 |
ID:
174053
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| Summary/Abstract |
Over the last few years, intergovernmental affairs and the roles of individual countries within the West have started to shift. In response, Kyiv (Kiev) should reorder the priorities and emphases of its foreign political, economic, and cultural policies. The central focus of this re-orientation should be more resolute than the hitherto deepening of Ukrainian relations has been, not only with the German government but also with the broader political elite, industrial companies, and the civil society of the Federal Republic. A recent systematic study of German perceptions of Ukraine can help develop new approaches, initiatives, and policies to reach a new level of German–Ukrainian partnership.
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| 2 |
ID:
193261
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| Summary/Abstract |
A number of para-academic tendencies in Russian social science helped prepare the Ukraine war. In addition to propaganda and disinformation campaigns by the Kremlin, an intellectual deformation of the Russian elite by the Manichean ideas of such theorists as Lev Gumilyov and Aleksandr Dugin is partly responsible for Russia's increasing secession from Europe. Post-Soviet public discourse has become infected with an array of speculative, often conspiratorial, and sometimes occultist or racist theories. Their proponents have crowded out acknowledged social scientists and historians from intellectual and media debates. This parallel public discourse has been developing since the beginning of glasnost, 35 years ago, and became one of the determinants of Russia's attack on Ukraine in 2014.
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| 3 |
ID:
174742
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| Summary/Abstract |
Among various geopolitical repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic are redefinitions of the short-term priorities of many international organizations. Among others, the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are becoming absorbed by new internal challenges, and are thus even less interested in further enlargement than before. Against this background, Kyiv, Tbilisi, and Chisinau, as well as their Western friends, need to seek new paths to increase the three countries’ security, resilience, and growth before their accession to the West’s major organizations. Above all, an alternative way to decrease Ukraine’s current institutional isolation is to develop more intense bilateral relations with friendly states across the globe, including Germany and the United States. In Eastern Europe, moreover, Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova should attempt to create new multilateral networks with post-communist member countries of NATO as well as the EU, and try to become part of such structures as the Three Seas Initiative or Bucharest Nine group.
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| 4 |
ID:
188115
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| Summary/Abstract |
Germany’s recent Ostpolitik (Eastern Policy) has become a major topic in Western discussions about how to deal best with Vladimir Putin’s Russia. This essay proceeds from Interdependence Theory to argue that the Berlin-promoted Nord Stream gas pipeline projects are loosening Russian-Ukrainian economic ties, and thereby easing conflict between the two post-Soviet states. Ukraine’s surprisingly peaceful development during its first 20 years as an independent state is contrasted with the escalation of tensions between Moscow and Kyiv in 2013–2014. The completion of the first Nord Stream pipe in October 2012 is seen as a crucial development that untied the Kremlin’s hand vis-à-vis Ukraine. The lowering of Moscow’s dependence on the Ukrainian gas transportation system, due to the new Baltic Sea pipeline, eventually led to a territorial conflict between Ukraine and Russia.
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| 5 |
ID:
166654
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| Summary/Abstract |
During and after Ukraine’s celebrated Euromaydan (literally: European Square) Revolution of 2013–2014, a whole number of novel Ukrainian political and societal phenomena emerged. One of the most intriguing was the relatively spontaneous and government-supported emergence of volunteer armed units from late spring 2014 onwards, in connection with the start of Russia’s covert paramilitary intervention in Eastern Ukraine. Among the most widely noted of these initially irregular detachments was the “Azov” battalion or regiment, named after the Azov Sea, created, in May 2014, by an obscure lunatic fringe group of racist activists. This paper briefly sketches the origins of Azov, biographies of some of its founders, and particulars of its creation, without touching upon such issues as Azov’s military performance, later integration into the National Guard under Ukraine’s Ministry of Interior, and political development after 2014.
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| 6 |
ID:
193263
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| Summary/Abstract |
As the situation in Western and Central Ukraine has for now stabilized, a trip to Kyiv can provide those interested in international affairs with a unique opportunity to observe world history in the making.
Back from a two-week trip to Kyiv, I share here my experience of visiting a country that is suffering from Europe's most important war since 1945. I can recommend to people interested in history and politics to visit Ukraine's central and western regions today. One should at once mention, however, the risks involved in such a private or professional research or experiential trip. Going to a war-torn country is more than extreme tourism.
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| 7 |
ID:
186388
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This article was submitted in late 2021, and became dated after Russia's demonstrative preparation as well as start of an open, large-scale invasion of Ukraine early 2022. We nevertheless publish this commentary here in order to document the debate about the events leading to the escalation. No adaptations to the original 2021 article were made after the outbreak of high-intensity war on 24 February 2022. Avoiding a larger military escalation in the Russian–Ukrainian conflict is an important aim. Yet, historical experience suggests that concessions by Ukraine or its Western partners toward Russian revanchist aspirations in the Donbas may not help achieve it. On the contrary, Western softness, and Ukrainian weakness vis-à-vis the Kremlin will lead to further confrontation.
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| 8 |
ID:
144422
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| Summary/Abstract |
Washington’s failure to fulfill its explicit security assurances in exchange for Ukraine dismantling its nuclear arsenal has greatly undermined US credibility and global nonproliferation.
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