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| 1 |
ID:
144446
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study analyzes the effects of political violence on electoral behavior by focusing on one of the longest lasting ethnic conflicts in contemporary times, the Kurdish insurgency in Turkey. How do armed conflict and electoral institutions shape turnout in a civil war context? Building on an original data-set at the sub-national level, the study reaches two major conclusions. First, it shows rural displacement caused by political violence led to lower levels of turnout and severely hampered access to voting controlling for a wide range of socioeconomic and electoral system variables. Second, an unusually high electoral threshold aggravated this pattern of disenfranchisement and limited the avenues of nonviolent Kurdish political activism with negative implications for the resolution of the conflict.
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| 2 |
ID:
193264
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| Summary/Abstract |
This World Affairs 2023 special issue contains six contributions, including this one, exploring some of the key political consequences of traditional beliefs such as magic and superstition in the developing societies of the Global South as well as in certain industrially advanced societies of the Global North. To show why traditional beliefs matter, we provide an explanation in this introduction for why traditional beliefs exist in developing countries, why they survive in developed countries, and why they may become more popular over time. By utilizing a simple game theoretic approach, we explain why rational people can sometimes increase their payoffs by subscribing to a superstition while superstitious people never gain by switching to rationality. In fact, the superstition—which has no causal connection with the natural course of events—may even yield better results, not only for the individual but also for the group. This is the reason why, in the framework of evolutionary stable equilibrium, superstitious people can demographically dominate an entire population over time. In addition to explaining the existence and the persistence (or the popularity) of traditional beliefs, we highlight the key findings presented in the articles included in this special issue. All of them underline a cardinal point: traditional beliefs matter. They shape electoral behavior, they shape attitudes toward democratic governance, and they influence voters’ assessment of political figures and historical events. Precisely because traditional beliefs have such extensive implications for a country's political life, we believe that in the future scholars will have to pay greater attention to such beliefs to have a better understanding of political phenomena and trends.
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| 3 |
ID:
193265
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| Summary/Abstract |
By exploring the relationship between socioeconomic development, secularism, and the pervasiveness of traditional beliefs, this article shows that while some traditional practices and beliefs, such as making use of traditional healers, are negatively and significantly related to several development indicators, there is little to no detectable (statistical) relationship between other traditional beliefs and practices, such as believing in and seeing a jinn, and development. The evidence presented in the article sustains the claim, advanced at the turn of the millennium by Inglehart and Baker, that the impact of socioeconomic development on values, attitudes, and cultural change is complex and non-linear.
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| 4 |
ID:
193267
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| Summary/Abstract |
The party system literature has generally paid little attention to whether traditional beliefs have any impact on voters’ electoral behavior and the stability of party systems. The purpose of the present study shows that the stability of party systems and the pervasiveness of traditional beliefs go hand-in-hand. This article is expected to advance the scholarly understanding of the political consequences of traditional beliefs by showing that voters who hold traditional beliefs or engage in traditional practices are not simply less likely to have pro-democratic attitudes or have a greater appreciation of dictatorial rule, but also more likely to vote for ruling parties in elections. The evidence presented in the article sustains a basic claim; namely, that the pervasiveness of traditional beliefs in Togolese society should be regarded as one of the determinants of the party system's stability.
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| 5 |
ID:
193266
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| Summary/Abstract |
While several studies on the issue have shown that traditional beliefs affect people's political behavior and preferences, very little attention has been paid to how traditional beliefs influence electoral behavior. The only study that has attempted to link traditional beliefs and electoral behavior has done so by analyzing the case of Togo where the party system has been traditionally fairly stable and unfragmented. The case of Indonesia, on the other hand, has undergone significant changes since the end of the Orde Baru, and what was once a fairly unfragmented party system now displays high levels of fragmentation. Hence, it is particularly interesting to explore how the presence/diffusion of traditional beliefs shapes the voters’ choices in a changing, increasingly fragmented, democratizing political system. Moreover, in reviewing the literature on Indonesian elections, we find that, first, the study of electoral behavior in Indonesia has made little effort to employ existing theoretical frameworks; second, quantitative studies are scarce; and third, there are practically no micro-level quantitative studies on electoral behavior. In this article, we assess whether and to what extent the electoral choice of a voter is affected by whether and to what extent they hold on to traditional beliefs by performing statistical analyses of original survey data. We find that voters with a traditional mindset are more likely to vote for the secular parties in the ruling coalition than voters who do not hold traditional beliefs.
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