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| 1 |
ID:
177902
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the role of history in professional military education (PME) in light of the recent US Joint Chiefs of Staff’s guidance on achieving ‘intellectual overmatch’. Louis Halewood and David Morgan-Owen argue that a narrow approach to the past, underpinned by preconceived notions of ‘relevance’, undermines what ability history has to serve the aims of military education. History need not be ‘applied’ to make it valuable, as its study can provide a broader understanding of warfare. Only by treating history more seriously, and by meaningfully engaging with the legacies of Britain’s own military past, can the discipline contribute to modern PME.
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| 2 |
ID:
144520
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article outlines recent trends in the scholarship on the Royal Navy in the years preceding the outbreak of the First World War. It explains the evolution of the historiography on the topic and outlines how and why new approaches are required to progress our understanding of the topic henceforth.
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| 3 |
ID:
187151
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| Summary/Abstract |
Tensions between civil and military authorities over issues such as budgets and strategic posture are unavoidable in pluralistic societies. Scholars of Civil-Military Relations (CMR) have identified a range of practices through which civil-military contestation occurs, and examined their implications for issues such as military effectiveness. This literature, however, has yet to incorporate critical approaches to knowledge into its analysis. Seeking to fill this gap, this article explores how the British military's presentation of its professional knowledge has been increasingly shaped by the political context of British defence policy. More specifically, it argues that the British armed forces’ presentation of opaque imaginations of future war in military doctrine has sought to entrench the role of Defence in an environment of increasingly integrated governmental responses to security challenges. To do this, the article focuses specifically on two concepts that have become increasingly significant in the British defence establishment's articulation of its professional authority and strategic purpose – Multi-Domain Integration (MDI) and the Integrated Operating Concept (IOpC). The article therefore contributes to the literature a fresh perspective of the role of military doctrine and epistemic practices in civil-military contestation, as well as a critical account of the politics of knowledge in British defence.
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| 4 |
ID:
144521
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the applicability of the concept of ‘revolutions’ in warfare to the study of pre-First World War British naval history. It argues that by attaching an overt degree of importance to the role of technological change in affecting transformations in contemporary views of war-fighting, historians have overlooked many aspects of Admiralty policy that can be better understood in terms of continuity, rather than ‘revolution’.
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| 5 |
ID:
188632
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study examines whether “invasion scares” before 1914 period had an impact on the course of British strategy. It shows that contemporary observers perceived a clear link between the ways in which British society depicted and understood issues of strategy and the ways in which the state could prepare for and conduct a future war. This was particularly so when it came to the language used to describe issues of security in Britain and the ideological consensus that these discourses reflected. The prominent place of discussions about how to defend the British Isles against invasion before 1914 therefore convinced some observers that Briton’s preoccupation with passive defence was rendering the nation vulnerable by robbing it of the capacity to adopt credible policies of deterrence and offensive action.
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| 6 |
ID:
169386
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores debates over whether Britain could have adopted a more “indirect approach” during the First World War (1914–18). It shows that convincing arguments that British sea power offered a legitimate alternative to the strategy of attrition on the Western Front never received due consideration because of shortcomings in Britain’s strategic decision-making apparatus. Britain might have fought the First World War very differently, and it might have been in its interest to have done so.
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