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ID:
144605
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| Summary/Abstract |
In February, Moscow and Washington issued a joint statement announcing the terms of a “cessation of hostilities” in Syria [1]—a truce agreed to by major world powers, regional players, and most of the participants in the Syrian civil war [2]. Given the fierce mutual recriminations that have become typical of U.S.-Russian relations [3] in recent years, the tone of the statement suggested a surprising degree of common cause. “The United States of America and the Russian Federation . . . [are] seeking to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Syrian crisis with full respect for the fundamental role of the United Nations,” the statement began. It went on to declare that the two countries are “fully determined to provide their strongest support to end the Syrian conflict.”
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| 2 |
ID:
144600
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| Summary/Abstract |
Between 1996 and 2011, I served as a consultant to the Kremlin [1], advising Russian Presidents Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin, and Dmitry Medvedev [2]. And yet even I can hardly claim to understand the real mechanisms of power in today’s Russia [3]. In the past few years, the country has reached a level of dysfunction that has pushed it to the brink, threatening its very existence. Ill-conceived military adventures, poor decision-making, and political skullduggery—sometimes of the lethal variety—have wreaked havoc on Russia’s economy and led to international isolation.
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| 3 |
ID:
144603
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| Summary/Abstract |
In recent years, many discussions of the Russian economy [2] have opened with an old joke. In the mid-1990s, John Major, the British prime minister, asked Russian President Boris Yeltsin [3] to characterize Russia’s economy in one word. “Good,” Yeltsin said. Major, seeking more detail, asked him to elaborate in two words. Yeltsin replied: “Not good.”
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