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MORATH, FLORIAN (2) answer(s).
 
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1
ID:   194008


Collective Action and Intra-group Conflict with Fixed Budgets / Konrad, Kai A; Morath, Florian   Journal Article
Konrad, Kai A Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract We study collective action under adverse incentives: each member of the group has a given budget (‘use-it-or-lose-it’) that is private information and can be used for contributions to make the group win a prize and for internal fights over this very prize. Even in the face of such rivalry in resource use, the group often succeeds in overcoming the collective action problem in the non-cooperative equilibrium. In one type of equilibrium, all group members jointly contribute; in the other type of equilibrium, volunteers make full standalone contributions. Both types of equilibrium exist for larger and partially overlapping parameter ranges.
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2
ID:   144788


Evolutionary determinants of war / Konrad, Kai A; Morath, Florian   Article
Konrad, Kai A Article
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Summary/Abstract This paper considers evolutionarily stable decisions about whether to initiate violent conflict rather than accepting a peaceful sharing outcome. Focusing on small sets of players such as countries in a geographically confined area, we use the concept of evolutionary stability in finite populations. We find that players’ evolutionarily stable preferences widen the range of peaceful resource allocations that are rejected in favor of violent conflict, compared to the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Relative advantages in fighting strength are reflected in the equilibrium set of peaceful resource allocations.
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