| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
144800
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article implements an experimental test of a game-theoretic model of equilibrium profiling. Attackers choose a demographic “type” from which to recruit, and defenders choose which demographic types to search. Some types are more reliable than others in the sense of having a higher probability of carrying out a successful attack if they get past the security checkpoint. In a Nash equilibrium, defenders tend to profile by searching the more reliable attacker types more frequently, whereas the attackers tend to send less reliable types. Data from laboratory experiments with financially motivated human subjects are consistent with the qualitative patterns predicted by theory. However, we also find several interesting behavioral deviations from the theory.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
163268
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
When commentators look back on the state of trust in contemporary world politics, the words of Charles Dickens in A tale of two cities will seem sadly appropriate: ‘It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of light, it was the season of darkness’. On the one hand, the president of the world's supposedly leading liberal democracy is given to emotional declarations of trust in some of the world's least trustworthy autocrats, with Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader...
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|