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ID: 183147

Collective Risk and Distributional Equity in Climate Change Bargaining / Mahajan, Aseem; Kline, Reuben ; Tingley, Dustin

Tingley, Dustin	Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract

International climate negotiations occur against the backdrop of increasing collective risk: the likelihood of catastrophic economic loss due to climate change will continue to increase unless and until global mitigation efforts are sufficient to prevent it. We introduce a novel alternating-offers bargaining model that incorporates this characteristic feature of climate change. We test the model using an incentivized experiment. We manipulate two important distributional equity principles: capacity to pay for mitigation of climate change and vulnerability to its potentially catastrophic effects. Our results show that less vulnerable parties do not exploit the greater vulnerability of their bargaining partners. They are, rather, more generous. Conversely, parties with greater capacity are less generous in their offers. Both collective risk itself and its importance in light of the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report make it all the more urgent to better understand this crucial strategic feature of climate change bargaining.

Key Words

Climate Change ; Bargaining ; Equity ; Laboratory Experiment ; Collective Risk

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ID: 144800

Paradox of misaligned profiling : theory and experimental evidence / Holt, Charles A; Kydd, Andrew ; Razzolini, Laura ; Sheremeta, Roman

Holt, Charles A	Article
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This article implements an experimental test of a game-theoretic model of equilibrium profiling. Attackers choose a demographic “type” from which to recruit, and defenders choose which demographic types to search. Some types are more reliable than others in the sense of having a higher probability of carrying out a successful attack if they get past the security checkpoint. In a Nash equilibrium, defenders tend to profile by searching the more reliable attacker types more frequently, whereas the attackers tend to send less reliable types. Data from laboratory experiments with financially motivated human subjects are consistent with the qualitative patterns predicted by theory. However, we also find several interesting behavioral deviations from the theory.

Key Words

Terrorism ; Game Theory ; Profiling ; Laboratory Experiment

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