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| 1 |
ID:
173764
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| Summary/Abstract |
Syria recently suffered a once in 500-year meteorological drought followed by one of the worst conflicts of the twenty-first century. We exploit subnational variation in drought impact to examine associations between climatic stress and Syria’s political unrest. Climatic stress may produce instability through both immediate hardship and, indirectly, internal migration. Consistent with the internal migration hypothesis, we find less severely drought-stricken Syrian regions more likely to experience protest. We employ nighttime lights as a proxy for population density to examine the association between climatic stress and internal displacement. We find climatic stress decreased nighttime light intensity during the drought period. Increases in nighttime lights from 2005 to 2010 are associated with added risk of protest in Sunni Arab areas, suggesting an influx of migrants bolstered local grievances. Our findings support the internal migration hypothesis and suggest extreme climate events may impact civil unrest via geographically and temporally indirect paths.
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| 2 |
ID:
144931
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| Summary/Abstract |
Does more representative government improve states' ability to fight domestic terrorism? In prior work, democracies are seen as more susceptible to terrorism because their respect for human rights prevents them from fully eliminating terrorist groups. However, such extrajudicial aggression could also alienate large portions of the population and create the ideal conditions for an insurgency. I argue that since terrorism is the lowest-capacity form of political violence, it is natural that states that do best at deterring political violence experience the most terrorism. While representative democracies should see terrorist groups initiate spells of attacks at a greater frequency, full political representation should also galvanize major political actors to unite and eliminate terrorist threats. I test this assertion through statistical models that treat the process of terrorist group initiation and its duration and intensity separately. Results not only show that less consolidated democracies and autocracies experience longer and more intense terrorist campaigns, but that, in support of the theory's mechanisms, groups are more likely to shift to terrorism from insurgency when their political base gains more political representation. The results call the division among research programs of various political violence types into question.
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| 3 |
ID:
189001
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| Summary/Abstract |
Does state weakness increase support for ethnic violence? This study proposes individuals who feel insecure due to state weakness are more likely to support interethnic violence conditional on exposure to chauvinist messaging. Support for interethnic violence is evaluated through a survey experiment in Southern Kyrgyzstan. The results show random assignment of chauvinist nationalist rhetoric only induces support for interethnic violence among respondents who trust informal non-state actors from their ethnic group to provide them security. The findings suggest state weakness leads individuals to view their ethnic group as an alternative provider of security and that when primed by chauvinist rhetoric, these individuals become more supportive of violence on their group’s behalf. A case study of the 2010 riots in the Southern Kyrgyz city of Osh illustrates how underlying support for violence may escalate to actual violence as a result of state breakdown, examining events in the months after the Kyrgyz state lost authority following the April 2010 revolution. Jointly, the survey findings and case study illustrate pathways for violence in ethnically divided low-capacity environments and potential drawbacks from protest-oriented revolutions.
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