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| 1 |
ID:
165748
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| Summary/Abstract |
Many countries serving in multilateral military coalitions are “paid” to do so, either in cash or in concessions relating to other international issues. An examination of hundreds of declassified archival sources as well as elite interviews relating to the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, the Iraq War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization operation in Afghanistan, the United Nations–African Union operation in Darfur, and the African Union operation in Somalia reveals that these payment practices follow a systematic pattern: pivotal states provide the means to cover such payments. These states reason that rewarding third parties to serve in multilateral coalitions holds important political benefits. Moreover, two distinct types of payment schemes exist: deployment subsidies and political side deals. Three types of states are most likely to receive such payments: (1) states that are inadequately resourced to deploy; (2) states that are perceived by the pivotal states as critical contributors to the coalition endeavor; and (3) opportunistic states that perceive a coalition deployment as an opportunity to negotiate a quid pro quo. These findings provide a novel perspective on what international burden sharing looks like in practice. Moreover, they raise important questions about the efficiency and effectiveness of such payment practices in multilateral military deployments.
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| 2 |
ID:
145024
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| Summary/Abstract |
How are UN peacekeepers recruited? While we know a lot about UN member states’ general predispositions to participate in UN peacekeeping operations, we know very little about the actual UN force generation process. What role do the UN and its powerful member states play in this process? How do they interact to recruit UN forces? This article seeks answers to these questions by means of an in-depth case study of the force generation process for the UN–AU operation to Darfur (UNAMID). The case study relies on over 50 interviews with high-level decision-makers as well as newly declassified documents from the National Security Archive in Washington, DC. Overall the case study depicts a tantalizing division of labour between the technical expertise of the United Nations and the political power of key UN member states. It appears that UN peacekeeping contributions sometimes require the provision of financial and/or other incentives that go beyond regular UN reimbursements. As a result, powerful UN member states need to step in. However, UN officials play an important brokerage role in this process informing interested UN member states which countries would be suitable for bilateral démarches and why.
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| 3 |
ID:
168931
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How does the European Union (EU) recruit troops and police to serve in EU peacekeeping missions? This article suggests that pivotal EU member states and EU officials make strategic use of the social and institutional networks within which they are embedded to bargain reluctant states into providing these forces. These networks offer information on deployment preferences, facilitate side-payments and issue-linkages, and provide for credible commitments. EU operations are consequently not necessarily dependent on intra-EU preference convergence—as is often suggested in the existing literature. Rather, EU force recruitment hinges on highly proactive EU actors, which use social and institutional ties to negotiate fellow states into serving in an EU missions.
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| 4 |
ID:
155498
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How does the United States build multilateral military coalitions? Conventional wisdom focuses on the role of formal alliance structures. Allies band together because they share threat perceptions, political ideology, norms, and values. I argue instead that US-led coalition-building efforts are influenced by the entirety of bilateral and multilateral ties that connects the United States with a third party. The breadth of institutions matters because it allows officials to gather information on the potential coalition partner’s deployment preferences beyond straightforward security considerations—such as what kind of economic and political considerations affect its willingness to join the coalition. Diplomatic embeddedness also helps American officials identify linkages between military and non-military interests. This facilitates the construction of side-payments. I find evidence for my argument by using an original dataset including all US-led multilateral coalitions in the pre– and post–Cold War era. I complement the quantitative analysis with a case study on US coalition-building efforts for the Korean War.
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| 5 |
ID:
158412
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Side-payments are commonly used in international relations to alter the foreign policies of states. Despite their frequent usage, however, our understanding is very limited as to why certain side-payment negotiations succeed, while others fail. This article tries to remedy this shortcoming. It argues that social embeddedness between actors involved in the negotiations has a major bearing on bargaining outcomes. Under ideal circumstances, social relationships can be used to reduce information asymmetries and increase trust. But in the presence of fractured social networks, social ties can foster information bias and distrust, ultimately increasing the likelihood of bargaining failure. The US-Turkish bargaining failure over the Iraq intervention in 2003 is used to illustrate and test this theory.
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| 6 |
ID:
171711
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What factors explain the institutional shape of military interventions spearheaded by France? This article suggests that Intervention Entrepreneurs are the deciding agents. To secure the viability of their intervention proposal, they select an intervention venue based on pragmatic grounds. Most importantly, they carefully study possible domestic and international opposition to their intervention plans and conceive institutional intervention choices accordingly. The result is an ad hoc selection of intervention venues with little impact of political ideology, norms, organisational interests, or historical learning. Moreover, on many occasions, little attention is paid to which intervention format would most benefit the peace and prosperity in the conflict theatre in the medium to long term. The article illustrates this argument by tracing French institutional decision-making for interventions in Chad/CAR, Mali, and Libya.
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