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| 1 |
ID:
170785
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| Summary/Abstract |
China is in the process of becoming an Atlantic naval power, Ryan D Martinson argues. Since 2014, the activities of the Chinese navy in the South Atlantic have evolved from port visits and largely symbolic joint exercises to independent operations at sea. This helps the Chinese navy to gain familiarity with the operating environment, so that it can effectively respond when called on by civilian leaders to protect China’s growing interests in the region. China’s increased naval presence in the South Atlantic may also reflect a shift in Beijing’s strategy for countering perceived threats from the US military in the Western Pacific.
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| 2 |
ID:
177821
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| Summary/Abstract |
The prospect of U.S. military involvement in a regional war looms large in Chinese naval strategy. This article examines the Chinese Navy’s evolving role in countering U.S. military intervention in a conflict over Chinese-claimed offshore islands. This role has both wartime and peacetime aspects. In peacetime, the PLA Navy serves a deterrence function, demonstrating China’s ability and resolve to fight the U.S. military if the U.S. were to intervene. In wartime, the operations of the PLA Navy would sit at the heart of any maritime campaign, helping to achieve China’s territorial objectives in spite of U.S. involvement.
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| 3 |
ID:
174310
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| Summary/Abstract |
The scale and speed of China’s naval construction bear only one conclusion: Beijing is seeking to erode U.S. naval supremacy. This judgment requires no specialized knowledge of China or access to top secret intelligence. One need only look at the platforms the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is building and the pace at which it is building them.
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| 4 |
ID:
188209
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| Summary/Abstract |
China is pursuing a “gray zone” strategy to advance its maritime claims in the East and South China Seas. That is, it is gradually expanding its control and influence over disputed maritime space by leveraging nontraditional tools of sea power—its coast guard and maritime militia—backed up by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Each of these forces plays a role in this strategy, but roles overlap and are mutually-supporting. Thus, the effectiveness of this strategy depends in part on the ability of the coast guard, navy, and militia to synergize their efforts. This article examines China’s efforts to improve jointness between the China Coast Guard (CCG) and the PLAN. In particular, it assesses recent developments in operational coordination, joint training and exercises, and intelligence sharing. It argues that despite widespread recognition in China of the importance of the CCG-PLAN relationship, the two services still fall short in all three areas.
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| 5 |
ID:
146448
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| Summary/Abstract |
What are the drivers behind China’s vigorous pursuit of sea power? What are the interests Beijing seeks to advance by building a powerful bluewater navy and the world’s largest coast guard? What are the principles that guide its use of sea power in pursuit of its national interest? How are China’s state objectives, and approaches to pursuing them, evolving over time?
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| 6 |
ID:
145205
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| Summary/Abstract |
On 21 July 2014, a Chinese law-enforcement ship, YZ 32501, arrived at its home port in Nantong, Jiangsu. As its crew disembarked, they were received by a senior officer from the China Coast Guard, who had travelled from Shanghai for the event. He thanked them for their 80 days of ‘continuous combat’ in the South China Sea.
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