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| 1 |
ID:
145247
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since the mid-2000s, China has experienced a wave of large environmental protests against major economic development projects. Based on both interviews and documentary sources, this article examines four prominent cases and identifies four innovations in China’s popular politics: broadened protest constituencies, mobilization for public goods, a proactive strategy to prevent government projects, and a mutual reinforcement of street mobilization and policy advocacy. These new traits of popular resistance have also begun to appear outside of the environmental arena. The way was paved for these innovations by transformations in the public sphere, a relative decrease in the risk of protest participation, and development of the environmental NGO sector. Although the new repertoire of contention appears in only some of China’s abundant protests, it is becoming more widespread and in some cases influences government policy. Recent environmental protests may well stand at the forefront of broader changes in the landscape of Chinese sociopolitical activism and contentious politics.
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| 2 |
ID:
189501
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| Summary/Abstract |
How do state authorities cope with popular contention under authoritarian legality? Based on ethnographic fieldwork and legal repression cases in China, this article highlights that conflicting rules and signals regarding contention management can impose considerable pressure on governments and motivate them to respond cautiously, even though the prevailing rhetoric of law-based governance provides a convenient basis on which authorities can legitimize their coercive actions. This study further theorizes a discreet pattern of government reaction under authoritarian legality – progressive legal repression – that rests on bureaucratic processing to overcome political uncertainty and lower potential risks before formally employing criminal sanctions to achieve domination. Instead of directly using criminal penalties to deter unruly protesters and potential dissenters, the preferred state action is to induce them to engage in available legal-bureaucratic procedures. By reconceptualizing protesters’ claims and behaviour as unreasonable and signalling fulfilment of responsibilities, bureaucratic practices help officials to reduce the risks of damaging their political image and receiving disciplinary action, encouraging them to deploy legal repression. This study reveals more complicated dynamics of state repression under authoritarian legality and emphasizes the important effects of procedural practices on governmental responses and the regime's stability.
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