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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
139451
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyzes issues 1–5 of the Taliban in Khurasan's Azan magazine. It applies an interpretive framework for analyzing radical narratives, based on a multidisciplinary conceptualization of the radicalization process, to explore how Azan attempts to appeal to its audiences by leveraging ingroup, Other, crisis and solution constructs via value-, crisis-, and dichotomy-reinforcing narratives. Two key findings emerge. First, Azan prioritizes content that empowers its readership toward action with narratives that link ingroup and solution constructs. Second, Azan uses a variety of narrative approaches in order to appeal to a potentially diverse readership at different stages of radicalization.
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| 2 |
ID:
139450
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 2013 Northern Ireland (NI) witnessed the most protracted period of public-disorder ever seen in the United Kingdom. After Belfast City Council voted to fly the Union flag in-line with the manner adopted in the rest of the United Kingdom, loyalist protestors blocked roads, attacked offices, and held marches through Belfast city center. During what became known as Operation Dulcet, police had to respond to the protests and violence, mindful of existing tensions in NI. This article reports on data collected from interviews conducted with officers involved in the policing of these events. The findings demonstrate that the police response was understood using narratives concerning the primacy of human rights, a focus on perceived proportionality, and ultimately, related to the potential violence linked to historic conceptions of community divisions in NI.
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| 3 |
ID:
139448
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| Summary/Abstract |
Testing social movement theory positing that radical organizations are ideologically driven at their core, but are supported by civilians who are driven by social factors, this research interrogates the disparity between radical group ideology and supporter belief set in the context of present-day Nigeria. Content analysis of randomly selected Boko Haram publications establishes the high, and increasing, levels of religiosity exhibited by the violent social movement itself. In contrast, a large-N survey of Nigerians conducted in 2012 and 2013 shows that high levels of religiosity do not significantly predict willingness to justify violence, commitment to non-state violent actors, or positive attitude toward Boko Haram among Nigerians as a whole, but rather the opposite. Given these findings, Boko Haram may be better understood within the tradition of radical extremist movements across the ideological spectrum, even while it frames its struggle as that of a distinctly religious movement.
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| 4 |
ID:
139449
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| Summary/Abstract |
Empirical analysis of civil wars wherein rebels receive support from outside states or actors confirms the expectation that such external support is correlated with conflicts that, on average, are longer than civil wars without external support. When this assistance is lost, the empirical results are at odds with the expectation that these wars should end more rapidly. Instead, wars in which there is a break in external support are more likely to continue into the next calendar year than even those wars with continued external support. This counterintuitive finding suggests a re-evaluation of theoretical foundations of external support to rebel groups.
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| 5 |
ID:
139447
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| Summary/Abstract |
An unprecedented number of Western women have recently joined the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The group has envisaged strictly non-combat roles for them, but violence is an essential part of their embraced ideology and several signs suggest that they could claim a more militant role. Their marginalization, however, is essential for the preservation of ISIS's power system and it is consequently unlikely that it would accommodate such aspiration, at least in the areas of the proclaimed caliphate. It could be different in the West, where women returning from conflict areas or those, even more numerous, anxious to join but unable to travel, could engage in violent acts.
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