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ID:
145401
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| Summary/Abstract |
Our study shows that alliance commitment is the key to the maintenance of the status quo between a weak challenger and a major-power attacker. In order to verify our theory, we employ data from Benson's typology of compellent military alliances and conduct empirical tests for our theoretical hypothesis. The statistical results comply with the theory, indicating that a trustful and strong military commitment creates negative effects on the status quo. We examine the cases of the Korean War and US-China-Taiwan relations to buttress our arguments. The latter case also shows the need to modify our original model under certain conditions.
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| 2 |
ID:
180452
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Trump administration has shown a strong inclination to play the “Taiwan card” and strengthen relations with Taipei in lieu of Washington’s traditional strategic ambiguity. As the U.S.-China trade competition escalated after 2018, the contending bilateral relations between Beijing and Washington created an opportunity for the administration of Tsai Ing-wen to adopt a more provocative strategy toward Beijing. In order to prevent conflict resulting from Taiwan’s new approach, more fundamental discussions on the definitions and dynamism of why the United States should adjust this traditional security policy are needed, this research suggests, in order to address the question of whether the United States should change to strategic clarity across the Taiwan Strait or adhere to its traditional strategic ambiguity. Moreover, this study also covers relevant literature on strategic ambiguity, investigating the changing patterns of decision making in U.S. foreign policy with regard to cross-Strait relations and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.
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| 3 |
ID:
145684
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article addresses the identifiable conditions for hedging strategies. By examining specific cases of policy choices and political situations in a triangular framework, the author suggests that Taiwan’s hedging behavior against China is sensitive to local variation in power capabilities, economic intention, and the security commitment from the United States.
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