| Summary/Abstract |
With Taiwan gradually losing its grip on air-and sea-superiority over the Taiwan Strait in recent years, China’s increasing Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strength and nuclear capability that is now capable of threatening the U.S. homeland have created many doubts about the U.S. security commitment to Taiwan. On the other hand, it has made China begin to believe that it may be able to resolve the cross-Strait situation with military assertiveness. The Ma Ying-jeou administration has long relied on the concept of defensive defense and cross-Strait military trust, hoping essentially for cross-Strait reconciliation. However, with China’s unwillingness to forgo the possibility of using force in cross-Strait affairs; and the growing presence of its offensive capabilities, defensive defense strategy cannot fully ensure Taiwan’s security. Taiwan may have to develop an effective and independent deterrence capability should it wish to maintain autonomy in the future, but certainly the actual effects and potential difficulties of this policy goal are highly debatable. If Beijing continuously fails to recognize the de facto existence of the Republic of China (ROC), then its push for political negotiation based on the socalled cross-Strait military mutual trust system and peace accord may unfortunately be deemed as nothing but political propaganda, and will not offer a true solution to Taiwan’s security dilemma.
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