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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
145537
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| Summary/Abstract |
Focused on Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and the Paris negotiations, scholars have overlooked Melvin Laird’s role as secretary of defense though his Vietnamization ended America’s presence in the ground war. I argue that Laird was Vietnamization’s architect and that in 1969 he proved critical in the formation of Nixon’s Vietnam strategy. That year, Nixon and Kissinger devised an elaborate plan to threaten and then launch a bombing campaign against North Vietnam to compel its capitulation. Laird contended the domestic front would not tolerate such a mad scheme. Instead, he developed what became America’s exit strategy, Vietnamization—the strategy of improving South Vietnamese military capabilities while withdrawing U.S. troops. Through Laird’s efforts, Vietnamization replaced Kissinger’s strategy to halt troop withdrawals and use unrelenting military force against North Vietnam. By the end of 1969, Nixon sided with Laird, hoping that Vietnamization could win the war at home and abroad.
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| 2 |
ID:
187243
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the 1960s, Australia’s commitment to collective security and its grand strategy of forward defense spurred its intervention in Vietnam. As British and American allies signaled retreat from Southeast Asia in 1968–1969, Prime Minister John Gorton sought to encourage U.S. resolve by keeping Australian forces there. With more American soldiers coming home under the guise of Vietnamization, the Australian public increasingly demanded troop withdrawals. The political facts of life became paramount, with Gorton’s government buckling in 1970. This article explains the military, strategic, diplomatic, and political considerations that produced Canberra’s decision to begin troop reductions in Vietnam.
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