| Summary/Abstract |
Japan has long been regarded by mainstream International Relations theories as a status quo power intent on pursuing an immobilist international strategy towards China characterized by hedging rather than any move to active balancing. The article argues that the conditions that are thought to encourage hedging behaviour—the predictability of other states’ intentions, the malleability of intentions through engagement, domestic preferences that obviate balancing, and a favourable offence–defence balance—are now deteriorating in the case of Japan’s strategy towards China. The consequence is that evidence is mounting of Japan’s shift towards active ‘soft’ and incipient ‘hard’ balancing of China through a policy of active ‘encirclement’ of China diplomatically, the build-up of Japanese national military capabilities aimed to counter China’s access denial and power projection, and the strengthening of the US–Japan alliance. This shift has become particularly evident since the 2010 trawler incident, and the return to power in 2012 of Prime Minister Abe Shinzō. The consequences of Japan’s shifting strategy are not yet clear. Japan may be moving towards a form of ‘Resentful Realism’ that does not add new equilibrium to regional security but is actually more destabilizing and poses risks for China and the USA, especially as Japan’s own security intentions become more opaque. These conclusions, in turn, invite a reconsideration of the comfortable theoretical consensus on Japan as an eternal status quo power.
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