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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
145771
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| Summary/Abstract |
By examining America's handling of the Phantom sale to Israel in light of the Middle East peace initiative, this paper will contend that, prior to the birth of America's unequivocal pro-Israeli stance, the Johnson administration viewed the Israeli–Jordanian negotiations simply as a spur to the neighboring Arab states to agree peace terms, thereby stemming the Soviet influence. Using the Phantom deal as leverage to coax Israel towards peace, while also reassuring them vis-à-vis national security, would therefore help peace become a reality. However, the approach failed, and so the Johnson administration had no choice but to give Israel the Phantoms, without exacting any corresponding peace concessions. This paper will therefore contend that the Phantom sale epitomized the failure of the Johnson administration's peace initiative, concluding that not only the power of lobbying and Israel's increasing strategic importance, but also this very failure, helped create America's de facto pro-Israeli policy.
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| 2 |
ID:
157216
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| Summary/Abstract |
Commentators generally accept that the Yom Kippur War and subsequent oil crisis crystallised Japan’s overtly pro-Arab stance. This analysis challenges that view—even after the oil embargo, Japan’s Middle Eastern policy was both discretely and, at times, blatantly pro-American. Admittedly, the Japanese government had a seemingly ambiguous attitude towards the Arab–Israeli conflict and on-going conflict between oil-producing countries and oil companies; however, responsible for formulating the Arab–Israeli policy, the Foreign Ministry preferred to follow American leadership in the region for reasons of national security and Cold War imperatives. The Foreign Ministry’s response to the 1972 Lod Airport Massacre, a radicalised Japanese New Left terrorist attack, revealed a determination to gain international credibility by more actively supporting the West. Lod buttressed the influence of the pro-American contingent in the government; and the 1973 Arab oil embargo did not undermine their position. Although the Cabinet eventually issued a public statement supporting the Arab cause to satisfy the Japanese public, the pro-American contingent succeeded surreptitiously in bringing the Cabinet together to uphold the American-led petroleum order as well as United States leadership in Cold War politics.
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