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ID:
145802
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Summary/Abstract |
While the October 1973 War has been studied from many angles, the Iraqi–American perspective has never been fully investigated. During this war the Bacth regime in Iraq felt compelled not only to send forces to the front, but also to harm American oil interests. As Washington was trying to mitigate the militant situation and prevent the imposition of an oil embargo, Baghdad continuously adopted a confrontational anti-American, anti-Israeli stance. This article uncovers evidence to show that while the Bacth regime did indeed attack American interests, it only did so in ways that would not endanger Iraqi stability and economic interests. The article is based mainly on US National Archives documents, as well as on Iraqi sources.
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2 |
ID:
151811
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Summary/Abstract |
The October 1973 war severely tested the relations of the Israeli government and military authorities with the national and foreign news media. Much has been said about the role of government and military press control and news management in muting and failing to bring to public notice the increasing signs of Egyptian and Syrian intentions before the war’s sudden outbreak. This article will focus on Israeli army news management during the war itself, a complex military campaign which opened in great disarray and with setbacks. Largely based on recently available archive material shedding light on the IDF’s wartime press work and on discussions and decision-making in the IDF high command, the paper examines the ways in which government and military sought to control and manage news reporting in the domestic and foreign media. It charts in particular the reasons for the growing distrust of statements by Israeli leaders and officially disseminated information in the early stages of the war, as well as the difficulties of the military apparatus in controlling the media, even when defeat turned eventually into victory. More than 40 years later, the issues discussed remain pertinent.
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