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| 1 |
ID:
145949
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| Summary/Abstract |
The next Administration will want to examine the last 15 years of strategic performance to improve sound strategy options and to promote timely re-assessment and adaptation of approved policies and strategies. Building off of two recent studies of U.S. decisionmaking and policy implementation at the strategic level, this article examines proposals to enhance the quality of policy making and implementation oversight mechanisms at the National Security Council. Major recommendations are offered to improve interagency planning and the creation of an inter-agency community of national security professionals.
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| 2 |
ID:
145954
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| Summary/Abstract |
China's Eurasian frontiers have emerged as a major factor in Beijing's foreign policy through President Xi Jinping's “One Belt, One Road” strategy. The article argues that this strategy has been given impetus by the shifting geopolitical landscape in Central Asia resulting from the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, Russia's relative decline, and Beijing's quest for stability in its restive province of Xinjiang.
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| 3 |
ID:
145946
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| Summary/Abstract |
More than once, I have heated milk on a gas stove only to have it boil over disastrously. The U.S. and its allies face at least four major and converging challenges that may also boil over like overheated milk, perhaps simultaneously. Social scientists will have more sophisticated frameworks, but this homely analogy of the full gas stove frames my points.
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| 4 |
ID:
145947
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| Summary/Abstract |
The thesis of this article is that cyber war technologies are spilling over into precision strike and nuclear mission areas. The result will transform deterrence and arms race stability and lead to other significant changes. The driver behind this is a combination of long standing problems with mobile missiles along with new technologies not usually factored into strategic assessments: big data analytics, computer vision, and related information systems. When combined with drones and precision strike, the hunt for mobile missiles is becoming faster, cheaper, and better. The implications of this finding vary by country, but will shape major power nuclear modernization, crisis stability among secondary powers, and conventional attack of nuclear deterrents.
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| 5 |
ID:
145948
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| Summary/Abstract |
The collapse or weakening of six empires over a 53-year period furnished the precondition for the rise of what we offhandedly call the modern Middle East. But if we mean “modern” as a concept of political sociology rather than a shorthand way of saying recent or contemporary, we must conclude that a “modern” Middle East is still straining to be born. We see that through an integrated analysis that explains not how the post-Ottoman Middle East arose, but why it took the shape it did.
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| 6 |
ID:
145951
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| Summary/Abstract |
Buffer zones as a concept have a long history. Despite their frequent occurrence in international relations past and present, however, they have been treated in passing by scholars and policymakers alike, and then usually from a purely historical perspective. Their importance in conflict management, third-party intervention and power politics are not adequately mirrored in scholarly research. This article seeks to remedy this lapse by re-introducing the buffer zone as a tool of international conflict management in a new and systematic fashion. In this article, we survey buffer zones, their conceptual roots and characteristics, and illustrate our theoretical findings with an array of different examples—predominantly from the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In so doing, we make three fundamental arguments about buffer zones.
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| 7 |
ID:
145953
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| Summary/Abstract |
Emerging trends suggest a more inclusive and collaborative approach to addressing international infectious disease issues, but without an overarching governance structure and judicial forum in place, outcomes will remain suboptimal. This essay outlines and analyzes several initiatives currently underway and proposes a new comprehensive global governance structure for infectious disease. This proposed structure has built-in incentives for states—from both the developed and developing world—to meet their regulatory obligations and integrates the myriad non-state actors operating in this space, including NGOs and the private sector. It also incorporates an adjudicative body that is able to enforce compliance and resolve issues of contention. Lastly, this essay identifies innovative funding mechanisms and contemplates the venue best suited to host and administer this new global governance structure for infectious disease with a focus on UN-based models.
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| 8 |
ID:
145950
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| Summary/Abstract |
Is “grand strategy” a useful concept? What is it, and how is it different from “strategy”? Some definitions of grand strategy—as an all-encompassing idea for coordinating the resources of an entire nation to achieve its ultimate goals—are unachievable, overly focused on strategy as a master concept, could unintentionally militarize domestic policy, and blur the lines between strategy and policy. The concept is salvageable. Grand strategy is best thought of as both the intellectual framework or master concept that ties together whole-of-government (but not whole-of-nation) planning, and the long-term pattern of behavior that reveals states’ behaviors and priorities in action.
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| 9 |
ID:
145952
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Following the Paris terrorist attacks of November 2015, Germany's Angela Merkel promised “to give France every support” in its war against jihadi terrorist groups, affirming that the “the Islamic State must be fought militarily.” After considerable debate, the Bundestag approved the deployment of German forces to the Middle East, Mali, and elsewhere, leading some to claim that Germany has set aside its reservations regarding the utility of force. A closer look at German contributions to UN and NATO missions from the 1990s through 2016 reveals, however, that Germany continues to draw a red line in terms of coercive airpower and direct combat operations. This reluctance stems from its interpretation of the past, demonstrating that constructivist approaches to strategic culture remain valid.
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