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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
148767
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article focuses on the debate surrounding constitutionalism that has been driven by a constitutionalist alliance of media reporters, intellectuals and lawyers since 2010, and follows its historical trajectory. It argues that this debate forms a discourse with a structuring absence, the roots of which can be traced back to the taboos surrounding the Cultural Revolution, the 1975 Constitution, and everything associated with them. The absence manifests itself in the silence on workers' right to strike, a right which was deleted from the 1982 Constitution in an attempt to correct the ultra-leftist anarchy of the Cultural Revolution. Previous and in contrast to that, there was a Maoist constitutional movement in the Cultural Revolution, represented by the 1975 Constitution, that aimed to protect the constituent power of the workers by legalizing their right to strike. Today, we are witnessing the rise of migrant workers as they struggle for trade union reform and collective bargaining with little support from the party-state or local trade unions. In this context, a third constitutional transformation should be considered that is not a return to the 1975 Constitution but which instead adds some elements which protect labour's right to strike to the 1982 Constitution.
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| 2 |
ID:
146101
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| Summary/Abstract |
The right to strike is everywhere recognized but appears unjustifiable. Strikers refuse to work but they claim a right to the job. This sounds like illiberal privilege, or at least it cannot be a coercively enforceable claim. I argue, however, that the right to strike is justified as a way of resisting intertwined forms of structural and personal domination associated with the modern labor market. Workers are structurally dominated insofar as being forced to make a contract with some employer or another leaves them vulnerable to exploitation. They are personally dominated insofar as they are required to submit to the arbitrary authority of managers in the workplace, which deepens their potential exploitation. Strikes contest this domination by reversing the relationship of power. Workers can formally quit the job but they can’t quit work, so strikers quit working but don’t quit the job.
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| 3 |
ID:
162218
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| Summary/Abstract |
Workers face a common dilemma when exercising their right to strike. For the worst-off workers to go on strike with some reasonable chance of success, they must use coercive strike tactics like mass pickets and sit-downs. These tactics violate some basic liberties, such as contract, association, and private property, and the laws that protect those liberties. Which has priority, the right to strike or the basic liberties strikers might violate? The answer depends on why the right to strike is justified. In contrast to liberal and social democratic arguments, on the radical view defended here, the right to strike is a right to resist oppression. This oppression is partly a product of the legal protection of basic economic liberties, which explains why the right to strike has priority over these liberties. The radical view thus best explains why workers may use some coercive, even lawbreaking, strike tactics.
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