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ID:
146118
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper examines the impact of regional sanctions on the trajectory of the Burundian regime following the 1996 coup. Despite the country's socioeconomic and geopolitical vulnerability, the Buyoya government initially withstood the pressure from sanctions. Through a vocal campaign against these measures, the new government mitigated the embargo's economic consequences and partially re-established its international reputation. Paradoxically, this campaign planted the seed for long-term comprehensive political concessions. While previous literature has attributed the embargo's success to its economic impact, the government actually responded to the sanction senders' key demand to engage in unconditional, inclusive peace talks once the economy had already started to recover. Based on a novel framework for studying the signalling dimension of sanctions, I show how the regime's anti-sanctions campaign, with its emphasis on the government's willingness to engage in peace talks, backfired, with Buyoya forced to negotiate after having become entrapped in his own rhetoric.
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| 2 |
ID:
153915
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| Summary/Abstract |
Western powers often turn to international sanctions in order to exert pressure on incumbent governments and signal their support for the opposition. Yet whether, and through what mechanisms, sanctions trigger protest remains unclear. We argue that sanction threats work as an international stamp of approval for would-be protesters; they encourage collective action against governments. Moreover, sanction threats send particularly clear and coherent signals if multiple senders issue them and if they focus on human rights, which makes such sanctions threats more effective in sparking social unrest. Using count models of protest activity, we find strong support for our arguments. We corroborate our findings with qualitative evidence from the case of Zimbabwe.
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| 3 |
ID:
147687
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| Summary/Abstract |
Peacebuilding attempts invoke a considerable amount of friction. In this article we argue that these frictional encounters can be made visible by focusing on articulations of resistance voiced by different actors in the intervention scene, including national elites and interveners. Departing from the discussion of the regionally led facilitation in Burundi, we show that the respective national elites and African interveners referred to different scales in order to legitimise their resistance: the Great Lakes Peace Initiative for Burundi resisted sedimented continental practices as well as international attempts to impose their conceptions of peace, whereas the Burundian elites repeatedly rejected regionally sponsored ‘solutions’ with reference to the domestic situation. Drawing on interviews with and statements by diverse national and regional forces, we show how claims to resist were articulated with respect to different spatial reference points and thereby explore how regional and domestic actors talked past each other.
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