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ID:
157352
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| Summary/Abstract |
Leaders generally conduct diplomacy through relatively autonomous agents. I argue that delegating diplomacy allows for credible communication by constraining leaders’ ability to bluff. Specifically, leaders can choose diplomats who place some value on the interests of their host countries. Such diplomats will only oppose foreign government policies when these impose large costs on their home country. Consequently, a message from such a diplomat enjoys greater credibility than one from a diplomat whose preferences mirror those of the leader. This gain in credibility increases the leader’s chances of obtaining concessions when the diplomat opposes foreign policies and reduces the probability of conflict. I show formally that, for the leader, the optimal diplomat is always biased in this way because the increased credibility offsets the diplomat’s occasional failure to support the leader’s position. I conclude with a case study focused on the career of Ambassador Walter Hines Page.
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| 2 |
ID:
146148
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| Summary/Abstract |
In conventional crisis bargaining models, bluffing provides the primary rationale for states to misrepresent their private information, and war occurs because strong states are unable to credibly demonstrate strength to their opponents. Here, I argue that military strategy supplies an alternative reason for states to misrepresent their private information. Both strong and weak states may misrepresent themselves because of the battlefield benefits of fighting against an uninformed opponent, who may choose a suboptimal military strategy. Under appropriate conditions, the military gains for concealing information exceed the diplomatic gains available for revealing that information. Thus, states will choose to keep secrets and fight. To demonstrate this, I incorporate military strategy into the standard bargaining framework, showing that military concerns incentivize both strong and weak states to conceal information, even when they are able to reveal that information costlessly and credibly. As in the usual model, war may occur when states underestimate their adversaries, but it may also occur when states overestimate their adversaries. I further show that a mere willingness to fight does not reveal that a state is strong. I conclude the paper with two brief case studies.
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