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| 1 |
ID:
182679
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| Summary/Abstract |
One way nuclear agreements might keep signatories from proliferating is by constraining nuclear capacity. Theoretical work on nonproliferation often points to such constraints as an important driver of nonproliferation success. Some have argued that, absent sufficient constraint, states with the desire and capability to proliferate will do so. Faced with more costly routes to a weapon, states subject to technological constraint may abide by the terms of the deal. This perspective poses an important empirical question: do nonproliferation agreements result in significant technological constraint in practice? This article evaluates the empirical prevalence of constraints arising from nonproliferation deals. Doing so requires (1) providing an appropriate measure of nuclear proficiency and (2) developing an estimate of the counterfactual, no-agreement capacity of states that received such agreements. This study addresses both of these points. First, new data are gathered to estimate proficiency, improving upon existing measures in the literature. Second, the generalized synthetic control method is applied to estimate counterfactual proficiency levels for the recipients of agreements. With this approach, the constraining effects of deals the United States implemented with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan and the Declaration of Iguaçu between Brazil and Argentina are evaluated. The findings indicate that the constraining effect of these nonproliferation agreements is minimal.
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| 2 |
ID:
165885
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How do new leaders impact crisis negotiations? We argue that opposing states know less about such a leader’s resolve over the issues at stake. To fully appreciate the consequences, we develop a multi-period bargaining model of negotiations. In equilibrium, as a proposer becomes close to certain of its opponent’s type, the duration and intensity of war goes to 0. We then test whether increase in leader tenure decrease the duration of militarized interstate disputes. Our estimates indicate that crises involving new leaders are 25.3 percent more likely to last one month than crises involving leaders with four years of tenure. Moreover, such conflicts are more likely to result in higher fatality levels. These results further indicate that leader tenure is a useful proxy for uncertainty.
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| 3 |
ID:
147900
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| Summary/Abstract |
Formal theory and historical case studies, especially those that use process tracing, are extremely well suited companions in research. To bolster future research employing both case studies and formal theory, we suggest some best practices as well as some (common) pitfalls to avoid.
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| 4 |
ID:
158682
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| Summary/Abstract |
Many international organizations reduce the costs states incur from conflict. Critics argue that the expectation of such aid, by mitigating potential suffering, perversely incentivizes states to initiate conflict more often. I develop a model that formalizes this intuition. It shows that institutions may still ameliorate suffering in two ways. First, they may absorb so many of the expected costs that they compensate for the fact that conflicts occur more often. Second, aid can have a second-order effect of reducing uncertainty about the costs of conflict; to the extent that this uncertainty explains why parties cannot negotiate a cooperative alternative, aid might actually reduce the incentive to initiate conflict. Whether aid ultimately helps or hurts therefore depends on how it interacts with the informational challenges states face.
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| 5 |
ID:
164172
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| Summary/Abstract |
Some terrorist organizations provoke their targets into deploying massive countermeasures, allowing terrorists to mobilize a greater share of their audience. Why would a government pursue such a costly strategy if it only strengthens the opponent? I develop a signaling model of terrorism, counterterrorism, and recruitment. If a target government is unsure whether the terrorists’ audience is sympathetic to the cause, weaker groups sometimes bluff strength by attacking. To check this bluff, governments sometimes respond to attacks with large-scale operations, even though they know they might be overreacting. Comparative statics reveal that overreaction regret is most likely when the target is wealthy and large operations are more effective. Thus, a selection effect creates the false impression that provocation is most effective against geopolitically privileged targets.
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| 6 |
ID:
146156
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| Summary/Abstract |
When do states impose sanctions on their rivals? We develop a formal model of domestic power consolidation, threats, escalation, and imposition of sanctions. With complete information, the target regime's consolidation of power determines the result—leaders with stable control can weather sanctions and thus deter their imposition, while vulnerable leaders concede the issue. However, when an imposer is uncertain of a foreign leader's consolidation, vulnerable types have incentive to bluff strength. Foreign powers sometimes respond by imposing sanctions, even though the parties would have resolved the crisis earlier with complete information. We then hypothesize that opponents of newer leaders—particularly in autocracies—are more likely to suffer from this information problem. Employing the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) data set and carefully addressing selection problems common to the sanctions literature, we show that sanctioners are indeed more likely to follow through on threats against such leaders.
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| 7 |
ID:
159249
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| Summary/Abstract |
If peace fails due to incomplete information and incentives to misrepresent power or resolve, war is supposed to serve as a learning process and allows parties to reach a mutually preferable bargain. We explore crisis bargaining under a third type of uncertainty: the extent to which one side wishes to conquer the other. With incomplete information and take-it-or-leave-it negotiations, this type of uncertainty is isomorphic to incomplete information about the probability of victory. However, with incomplete information and bargaining while fighting, standard convergence results fail: types fail to fully separate because there is no differential cost for delay. Wars correspondingly last longer while benefiting no one. These results help explain empirical differences between territorial versus nonterritorial conflicts and interstate versus intrastate wars.
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| 8 |
ID:
170022
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| Summary/Abstract |
Conventional wisdom about economic interdependence and international conflict predicts that increasing opportunity costs make war less likely, but some wars occur after costs grow. Why? We develop a model that shows that a nonmonotonic relationship exists between the costs and probability of war when there is uncertainty over resolve. Under these conditions, increasing the costs of an uninformed party's opponent has a second-order effect of exacerbating informational asymmetries about that opponent's willingness to maintain peace. We derive conditions under which war can occur more frequently and empirically showcase the model's implications through a case study of Sino-Indian relations from 1949 to 2007. This finding challenges how scholars traditionally believe economic interdependence mediates incentives to fight: instruments such as trade have competing effects on the probability of war.
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