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INTELLIGENCE POLITICIZATION (3) answer(s).
 
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ID:   161732


Intelligence Politicization in the Republic of Korea: implications for reform / Seo, Hyesoo   Journal Article
Seo, Hyesoo Journal Article
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2
ID:   146169


Temptation of intelligence politicization to support diplomacy / Rubin, Michael   Journal Article
Rubin, Michael Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract Good diplomacy goes hand-in-hand with good intelligence. Just as courtroom lawyers never ask a question to which they do not already know the answer, so too should politicians and diplomats avoid negotiating with enemies without first understanding what they bring to the table and what they seek to conceal. Because rogue regimes are among America's most opaque and dangerous adversaries,1 a breakthrough in relations can define a President's legacy and make diplomats’ careers. Too often, the temptation to succeed can be overwhelming. When intelligence clashes with political and diplomatic goals, the sanctity of intelligence often loses: seldom do Presidents want their diplomatic initiatives to be the sacrifice.
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3
ID:   149295


When Casey’s blood pressure rose: a case study of intelligence politicization in the United States / Hänni, Adrian   Journal Article
Hänni, Adrian Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract This article contributes to the debate on the politicization of intelligence with a case study of a major attempt of politicization that so far largely escaped academic attention: the Special National Intelligence Estimate on the Soviet Union’s role in international terrorism produced by the US Intelligence Community in spring 1981. Despite direct and indirect manipulation by members of President Reagan’s Cabinet, this case differs from those usually discussed in a decisive way – politicization failed. Based on the empirical analysis, a theoretical model of intelligence politicization is introduced that extends Joshua Rovner’s oversell model, which can explain why policymakers demand intelligence support but is insufficient due to its exclusive focus on the consumers of intelligence, by integrating the incentives of intelligence producers and specifying the determinants of whether politicization succeeds or fails.
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