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EXTERNAL SUPPORTERS (2) answer(s).
 
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1
ID:   146181


Negotiation calculus: why parties to civil conflict refuse to talk / Kaplow, Jeffrey M   Journal Article
Kaplow, Jeffrey M Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract Why do some parties to intrastate conflict refuse to negotiate? I propose a simple theory of civil conflict in which the act of negotiation itself carries costs and benefits. Several hypotheses follow: parties to civil conflict will avoid negotiation when they (1) fear alienating external supporters or internal constituencies, (2) risk granting legitimacy to their opponents or signaling weakness to other potential claimants, or (3) find it difficult to identify reliable negotiating partners. Empirical tests find support for my argument. My findings suggest that cases exist in which the parties would reach an agreement if only they could overcome the costs of negotiation and engage in talks. Diplomats and mediators should consider the costs and benefits of talks when planning the timing and form of interventions designed to bring parties to the table.
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2
ID:   169075


What Matters Is Who Supports You: Diaspora and Foreign States as External Supporters and Militants’ Adoption of Nonviolence / Marina G. Petrova   Journal Article
Marina G. Petrova Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract Militant groups are usually committed to violent tactics to pursue their goals. Yet, in certain cases, militants adopt nonviolent tactics and desist from violence. As internal conflict rarely remains isolated from outside influence, I argue that external supporters affect militant groups’ tactical considerations. I expect that different external benefactors will have different effects on the probability of switching to nonviolent tactics. The focus here is on diaspora and foreign states as external supporters, and I conduct a large-N analysis with violent group-level data. I find that external support from diaspora is positively associated with rebels’ adoption of nonviolent tactics, while support from foreign states is not. In fact, foreign states as supporters are not as effective influencers as diaspora. These findings shed light on the important role of nonstate actors in conflict dynamics and present evidence that challenges the notion that diaspora’s involvement prolongs internal conflicts
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