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ID:
148604
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| Summary/Abstract |
This essay examines the discourse on Palestine/Israel in the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, charting the impact of the Palestine rights movement on the domestic U.S. policy debate. Policy analyst, author, and long-time activist Phyllis Bennis notes the sea change within the Democratic Party evident in the unprecedented debate on the issue outside traditionally liberal Zionist boundaries. The final Democratic platform was as pro-Israel and anti-Palestinian as any in history, but the process of getting there was revolutionary in no small part, Bennis argues, due to the grassroots campaign of veteran U.S. senator Bernie Sanders. Bennis also discusses the Republican platform on Israel/Palestine, outlining the positions of the final three Republican contenders. Although she is clear about the current weakness of the broad antiwar movement in the United States, Bennis celebrates its Palestinian rights component and its focus on education and BDS to challenge the general public's “ignorance” on Israel/Palestine.
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| 2 |
ID:
156874
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| 3 |
ID:
146403
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| 4 |
ID:
175768
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| Summary/Abstract |
As I write this in mid-March of 2020, events, priorities and attitudes are changing at a dizzying speed. Everything is eclipsed by fear and apprehension regarding the coronavirus. Even before the virus took front and center, the rapid reversal in the political fortunes of Bernie Sanders and Joe Biden as a result of the South Carolina primary on February 29 and Super Tuesday on March 3 meant that most Democrats (though by no means all) accepted that they would almost certainly be relying on Joe Biden to defeat Donald Trump in November, which is their overwhelming priority.
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| 5 |
ID:
173186
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| Summary/Abstract |
Tensions between the United States and China have been on the rise under Xi Jinping and Donald Trump, challenging longstanding regional moves to peace and prosperity. In response, a number of less powerful East Asian states have taken steps toward deeper regional economic ties and multilateral institutions. This paper analyzes these competing tensions and their implications for the Asia-Pacific regional order.
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| 6 |
ID:
166156
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| 7 |
ID:
182595
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Biden Administration has accepted the Trump Administration’s definition of China as a ‘strategic competitor’, and has retained Trump’s tariffs, the ‘Quad’, and the upgrade in Taiwan’s protocol status. But Biden’s China policy is different from Trump’s in being truly strategic. The key elements of that strategy are focused on improving the United States’ competitiveness domestically and in international affairs; cooperation with allies and partners; an emphasis on human rights; partial decoupling of economic and technology relationships; and a search for some areas of cooperation with China. Success for the Biden strategy would consist neither of bottling up China in its current global power position nor in achieving a negotiated condominium in Asia. The Biden Administration would succeed if the United States can maintain its alliance system, keep a robust military presence in East Asia and prevent the forcible integration of Taiwan into China while avoiding major war. Several features of the China challenge make it reasonable to hope that such success is possible.
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| 8 |
ID:
182995
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| Summary/Abstract |
The January 6 attack was unique in its target and potential consequences. But the methods employed were common in the 5th Wave where far-right demonstrations became common. They began against President Obama and were then encouraged by President Trump. The article examines those demonstrations, the participants, methods, and the difficulties government forces have had in dealing with them.
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| 9 |
ID:
168032
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| 10 |
ID:
168887
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| Summary/Abstract |
This analysis uses case study methodology to further the understanding of the diversionary theory of war in specific cases. It employs a model consisting of five propositions that build upon existing qualitative research on diversionary war theory. The synthesised framework examines one possible case of American diversionary military actions: President Donald Trump´s decision to launch missile strikes against Syrian airfields on 7 April 2017. The study tests the descriptive accuracy and further develops the diversionary theory of war, in essence, generally suggesting that empirical support for the diversionary logic in this case is mixed.
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| 11 |
ID:
189903
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article challenges the existing scholarship’s characterisation of Chinese liberal intellectuals as Trumpian intellectuals. By conducting a close reading of Chinese academic publications, lectures and opinions aired on social media, this article finds that besides Trump’s Chinese liberal fans, many leading Chinese liberal intellectuals harshly criticised Trump. However, they do not align themselves with American liberals in making all-out partisan criticisms of Trump and American right-wing politics. Instead, their criticisms are mostly centrist. This article argues that Chinese liberal intellectuals’ centrist criticisms of Trump reflect their Confucian, egalitarian and moderate nationalist sympathies, dimensions of their thoughts which have been ignored by existing scholarship regarding them. By exploring Chinese centrist liberal critics of Trump, this article brings to light the ideological heterogeneity within the Chinese liberal camp previously lumped together under the umbrella of “anti-authoritarianism.”
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| 12 |
ID:
148357
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| Summary/Abstract |
The 2016 US presidential election was uncomfortable for the Vatican and the American bishops.
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| 13 |
ID:
182524
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| 14 |
ID:
162119
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| 15 |
ID:
173035
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| Summary/Abstract |
Trump is providing a course correction for the postwar global order that may be the best hope for sustaining it. His policies may moderate the radical changes of the past seventy-five years, but they are unlikely to reverse them.
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| 16 |
ID:
151166
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| 17 |
ID:
159262
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| 18 |
ID:
168042
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| Summary/Abstract |
Russia is a dangerous adversary. But treating it as an outright enemy could result in a self-fulfilling prophecy, triggering mortal threats to its neighbors which otherwise may not be in the cards.
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| 19 |
ID:
165401
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| Summary/Abstract |
Are people conservative (liberal) because they are Republicans (Democrats)? Or is it the reverse: people are Republicans (Democrats) because they are conservatives (liberals)? Though much has been said about this long-standing question, it is difficult to test because the concepts are nearly impossible to disentangle in modern America. Ideology and partisanship are highly correlated, only growing more so over time. However, the election of President Trump presents a unique opportunity to disentangle party attachment from ideological commitment. Using a research design that employs actual “conservative” and “liberal” policy statements from President Trump, we find that low-knowledge respondents, strong Republicans, Trump-approving respondents, and self-described conservatives are the most likely to behave like party loyalists by accepting the Trump cue—in either a liberal or conservative direction. These results suggest that there are a large number of party loyalists in the United States, that their claims to being a self-defined conservative are suspect, and that group loyalty is the stronger motivator of opinion than are any ideological principles.
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| 20 |
ID:
157482
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper seeks to examine candidate Trump's campaign rhetoric about Asia and President Trump's policy toward Asia. It will look at Trump's announcements during his presidential campaign and show that Trump, the candidate, had made various proposals on the U.S. approach to China and American allies in Asia, which had made Asian capitals deeply concerned. In the Asian view, if Trump's campaign promises were realized, the world would be characterized by political tensions, trade protectionism, and arms races. The paper goes on to examine the Trump administration's foreign policy toward American allies in Asia and toward China. It demonstrates, that though the United States are being governed by a new administration—The Trump administration—the U.S. national interest and constitution do not change. President Trump and his administration have found it necessary to maintain many elements of Obama's Asia policy for U.S. interests.
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