| Summary/Abstract |
This article applies a form of organizational analysis to the military institution responsible for China’s nuclear weapons, the PLA Rocket Force and its predecessor, the Second Artillery. Analyzing the ways in which this military institution manages and allocates its human capital can offer potential insights into both China’s operational practices and the institutional and strategic priorities of the country’s missile forces. Specifically, the article examines career paths of PLA officers in the Rocket Force, with a particular focus on those officers who eventually rise to the ranks of senior leadership. The analysis yields evidence that senior leaders are more likely to have served in the Rocket Force’s premier conventionally-armed missile base, that there is an informal institutional hierarchy among the missile bases, and that, at least at the personnel level, there is some separation between conventional and nuclear units. These findings have important implications for assessing potential escalation dynamics in a possible conflict between China and the United States and for forecasting the future development of China’s missile forces.
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