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ID:
146818
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Summary/Abstract |
Protest can be seen as a highly democratic expression of popular opinion. However, protest is also a non-representative, extra-institutional process for political change. In hybrid regimes, such as Ukraine, the legitimacy of effecting change through mass protest is a subject of debate. Because of the influence of mass protests in Ukrainian politics, individual views on the democratic legitimacy of protest are potentially important in perceptions of government legitimacy. Using original survey data from December 2013, this article finds that, whereas satisfaction with the functioning of democracy, partisanship, and the oft-cited regional divide are important determinants of approval for the Euromaidan protests, they do not influence how Ukrainians perceive the role of protest in a democracy. However, among those less committed to democracy, protest is more likely to be seen as illegitimate.
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2 |
ID:
171834
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Summary/Abstract |
Individuals tend to favor important trade partners in their foreign policy preferences. Cultural affinity is also known to influence individuals’ foreign policy stances. This study examines how citizens prioritize international relations with trading partners in the face of ethnolinguistic divisions. Using survey data on foreign policy preferences paired with data on bilateral trade between Ukraine and its two largest trade partners (Russia and the European Union [EU]), I find that ethnolinguistic identity and relative trade exposure both affect foreign policy preferences and that these effects introduce cross-cutting cleavages. Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians in regions where the economic importance of trade with Russia is relatively higher are more likely to favor foreign policy oriented toward Russia than Ukrainian speakers elsewhere. Similarly, Russian speakers in areas with high levels of trade with the EU have more EU-oriented foreign policy preferences.
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