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ZHOU, TITI (3) answer(s).
 
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1
ID:   171042


How are the exposed disciplined? media and political accountability in China / Zhou, Titi; Cai, Judy Xinyu   Journal Article
Zhou, Titi Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract Authoritarian governments are believed to tolerate media exposure of malfeasant agents to hold them accountable. This line of argument is based on the strong assumption that erring agents will be duly disciplined once their malfeasance is known to their superiors. This study tests this assumption by examining how the Chinese government responds to exposed agents. It finds that media exposure conditionally contributes to the discipline of agents. Exposed agents may be punished when their malfeasance gains high publicity, especially when the malfeasance falls under the high-priority concerns of the government. Hence, while media exposure constitutes a form of third-party monitoring, the discipline of exposed agents is conditional.
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2
ID:   146904


New information communication technologies and social protest in China: information as common knowledge / Cai, Yongshun; Zhou, Titi   Journal Article
Cai, Yongshun Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract People who rely on new information technologies to orchestrate protests face a common-knowledge constraint: the information on a proposed protest they release to potential participants can also be known by the government. This article examines the conditions under which protests mobilized through new information technologies become possible in China.
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3
ID:   166870


Online political participation in China: local government and differentiated response / Cai, Yongshun ; Zhou, Titi   Journal Article
Cai, Yongshun Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract Chinese citizens commonly take to the internet to voice complaints concerning their daily lives. The political hierarchy in China dictates that local governments are primarily responsible for addressing such grievances. This study investigates how local governments deal with online complaints and finds that they respond in a variety of ways and that their choice of a particular form of response is shaped by the pressure generated by the complaint and the cost of resolving it. This study contributes to the understanding of government responsiveness in China by directly assessing the quality of governmental responses and by measuring the pressure and costs faced by the government when dealing with online complaints. It also explains how the Chinese government, without having to rely on censorship, shields regime legitimacy from media exposure.
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