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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
146436
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| Summary/Abstract |
A major Chinese narrative regarding the South China Sea is one of unreciprocated restraint. But Chinese leaders have clearly had an ambitious long-term vision of some sort, backed by years of efforts, themselves based on long-standing claims encapsulated in an ambiguous “nine-dash line” enclosing virtually all of the South China Sea
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| 2 |
ID:
146437
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| Summary/Abstract |
As the frequency and scope of China’s paramilitary and military presence activities in the East and South China Seas have increased in the last few years, officials and analysts inside and outside China have worried more and more about the potential for military crises erupting between China and other actors. Given the perceived high stakes of many of these potential disputes—they touch on sovereignty, territorial integrity, national dignity, and development resources—some observers are concerned about the risks of escalation to military conflict, whether deliberate or accidental.
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| 3 |
ID:
146438
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| Summary/Abstract |
Much has been written about the challenges posed by the Chinese adoption of what the U.S. military calls “A2/AD” (antiaccess/area-denial) in the western Pacific. Accordingly, the Pacific remains a key focus area for the U.S. Navy and Air Force, and more recently the Army, with the Navy promising to put 60 percent of its forces in that theater as part of the “Pacific pivot.” Yet as focus remains on the Pacific, the rest of the world is not standing still. This is exemplified in the eastern Mediterranean, where the Russians have begun laying the seeds to create an A2/AD zone in the region against the United States and its allies. If fully realized, an A2/AD envelope would put Western access to the Suez Canal, the Black Sea, and the resource-rich eastern Mediterranean at the mercy of an increasingly aggressive Russian regime.
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| 4 |
ID:
146440
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| Summary/Abstract |
Successful organizations can be extraordinarily persistent and creative in denying the obvious, ignoring signals that suggest a need to challenge key strategic assumptions. The U.S. military has been the world’s unrivaled force for twenty-five years, even lacking a peer competitor in some domains—naval operations, for example—since 1943. A danger of such sustained success is that the military might come to view these strategic assumptions not as ideas requiring continual reassessment but as enduring laws.
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| 5 |
ID:
146439
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| Summary/Abstract |
The epigraphs that open this article are but three of a vast number of quotes from U.S. presidents, members of Congress, and military leaders calling for support of a U.S.-flag merchant marine.1 Throughout American history, dozens of laws have been proposed and passed that have, in varying degrees, supported the operation of U.S.-flag ships in both coastal and international trade; no law ever passed has called for a reduction in or the elimination of U.S.-flag ships. And yet, despite periods of great growth at various times in U.S. history, the U.S. Merchant Marine, once again, is in serious decline today.
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| 6 |
ID:
146441
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| Summary/Abstract |
As the world’s only superpower, the United States of America finds itself challenged by adversaries who know they cannot confront it directly, toe to toe, on traditional battlefields, or on or under the world’s oceans. 1 In their attempts to follow Sun Tzu’s instruction to “subdue the enemy without fighting,” potential adversaries of the United States continuously assess and probe American strengths and weaknesses to identify vulnerabilities for military, political, and industrial exploitation. It is not fully appreciated, assessed, or addressed by American policy makers and warfighters how vulnerable the U.S. military is to the threat of “lawfare,” both international and domestic environmental.
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