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| 1 |
ID:
145504
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| Summary/Abstract |
On 16 October 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin attended a parade in Belgrade marking the 70th anniversary of its liberation by the Red Army and the Communist-led Yugoslav Partisans. In addition to being a public display of the historic bonds and mutual friendship between the two states, the event also symbolically reaffirmed the role of the Yugoslav Partisans in these operations by parading their old battle flags. In light of strong revisionist tendencies in the past 25 years that sought to diminish or even deny the Partisans’ contribution to the liberation of the country, this represents a small but important gesture. The aim of this article will be to provide an overview of operations in Serbia from late September to late October 1944, to quantify the Partisans’ contribution to the campaign, and to briefly discuss Soviet-Yugoslav cooperation during this period.
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| 2 |
ID:
145503
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| Summary/Abstract |
During the writing of this article about 30 books were analyzed—diaries, analytical materials, and memoirs of servicemen of the Wehrmacht, which contained evaluations of the qualities of the Red Army and Russian soldiers. In the opinion of the German authors, the Red Army was a worthy enemy, and the Russian soldier presented himself as an extremely dangerous opponent.
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| 3 |
ID:
145506
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the failure of the Stalingrad airlift — the German Luftwaffe’s effort to supply the encircled 6th Army by air during the famous Second World War battle — from a logistical perspective. Drawing upon German reports on the operation, it argues that a critical factor in the outcome of the airlift was the Luftwaffe’s failure to provide its transport units with the tools they needed to maintain an adequate count of operational aircraft — tools that included airfield facilities, supplies, manpower, and even aircraft suited to the prevailing conditions. These factors, taken together, prevented the Luftwaffe from effectively employing the full potential of its transport forces, ensuring that they were unable to deliver the quantity of supplies needed to sustain the 6th Army.
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| 4 |
ID:
145501
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| Summary/Abstract |
This essay examines Russia’s ongoing counterinsurgency war in the North Caucasus in the light of Russian historical strategies and some Western or comparative principles that pertain to such wars. We argue that Russia is failing to bring this war toward resolution and that it is already deforming the state structure and could engender even more negative consequences for the Russian state due to conditions under which it is being waged, including the impact of Moscow’s wars in Syria and Ukraine.
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| 5 |
ID:
145500
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| Summary/Abstract |
The United States faces imminent decisions about strategic nuclear force modernization that will take place over the next several decades. At the same time, the United States and Russia are obligated under the New START Treaty to reduce their respective numbers of operationally deployed warheads and launchers to meet treaty requirements by 2018. Russia as well as the United States anticipates a significant modernization of its strategic nuclear forces. Options exist for the United States and Russia to modernize nuclear forces as they remain open to the possibility of additional, post-New START nuclear arms reductions.
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| 6 |
ID:
145502
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the security policy of the Central Asian (CA) states, by comparing theory (security documents) with practice (the actual security challenges). The lack of CA regional (security) cooperation and authoritarian rule puts political and economic stability at stake. The internal and external threats are partly caused by the CA regimes themselves: Political opposition groups are often described as terrorists and/or blamed to be connected to Islamic State (IS). There is hardly any effort toward improving social-economic circumstances, which would take away grounds for (Islamic) radicalization. Moreover, the CA governments are themselves responsible for regional border, water, and energy disputes. Political unrest and radicalization, IS, as well as terrorism and drugs from Afghanistan could become serious threats to the survival of CA governments.
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| 7 |
ID:
145505
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| Summary/Abstract |
Shortly before and after the USSR’s demise, a new literature emerged: memoirs by veterans of the Soviet Union’s massive military intervention in the Arab-Israeli conflict in the 1960s and ’70s. Resurgent Russian pride, coupled with condemnation of its corruption by Soviet crimes, permitted startling disclosures. Tools we developed to evaluate these sources found them remarkably reliable and necessitated a reassessment of existing historiography. The Putin administration marked a reversal. Russian nationalism now stressed continuity with the USSR’s great-power status. ‘Falsification of history against Russian interests’ was criminalized. Some veterans resorted to purported ‘fiction’, which if challenged could be disclaimed. But under even stricter scrutiny, these narratives generally proved to reflect the authors’ actual experience, providing significant pointers for further research.
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