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ID:
144523
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores the development of tactical thought in the Royal Navy during the period leading up to the First World War, and concludes that the direction of tactical thinking and Admiralty construction policy contradict claims put forward by Jon T. Sumida that in 1912 Admiral Sir John Jellicoe developed a ‘technical-tactical synthesis’ that called for fighting at medium ranges (7,000–10,000 yards).
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| 2 |
ID:
144520
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article outlines recent trends in the scholarship on the Royal Navy in the years preceding the outbreak of the First World War. It explains the evolution of the historiography on the topic and outlines how and why new approaches are required to progress our understanding of the topic henceforth.
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| 3 |
ID:
144525
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| Summary/Abstract |
Revisionist historians have argued that in July 1914 Britain’s First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, was preparing to implement a ‘Naval Revolution’ based on radical ideas they attribute to Admiral Sir John Fisher. This article examines Fisher’s influence on Churchill in 1911–14. By subjecting the revisionist argument to rigorous scrutiny, it demonstrates that Churchill did not embrace either ‘flotilla defence’ or the ‘battlecruiser concept’, the two central components of Fisher’s supposed radical agenda. On the eve of war, Churchill’s immediate goals were neither revolutionary nor inspired by Fisher. The weakness of the revisionists’ argument undermines their broad interpretation of naval policy during the Fisher era.
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| 4 |
ID:
144522
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| Summary/Abstract |
Revisionist interpretations of British naval policy in the Fisher era claim that an elaborate smokescreen was created to hide the Royal Navy’s real policies; while documents showing the true goals were systematically destroyed. By asserting this, revisionists are able to dismiss those parts of the documentary record that contradict their theories, while simultaneously excusing the lack of evidence for their theories by claiming it has been destroyed. This article shows that this methodology is misleading and untenable.
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| 5 |
ID:
144524
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article examines for the pre-First World War period: the developments in gunnery techniques; the gunnery practices and especially the firing ranges; and the tactical games and exercises conducted in the Grand Fleet, with their emphasis on the perceived threats from mines dropped from destroyers and from torpedoes from submarines. It concludes, contrary to Professor Sumida’s currently accepted interpretation, that at no time was ‘the development and maintenance of the capability to outfight the German battle fleet at medium range … the primary objective of British tactical preparation’.
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| 6 |
ID:
144521
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the applicability of the concept of ‘revolutions’ in warfare to the study of pre-First World War British naval history. It argues that by attaching an overt degree of importance to the role of technological change in affecting transformations in contemporary views of war-fighting, historians have overlooked many aspects of Admiralty policy that can be better understood in terms of continuity, rather than ‘revolution’.
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| 7 |
ID:
144526
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| Summary/Abstract |
Nicholas Lambert argues that in 1912 Britain believed it had developed an economic warfare strategy that promised a quick and bloodless victory in the event of war against Germany. This article scrutinises this argument and demonstrates that its evidential and methodological flaws render it untenable.
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