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| 1 |
ID:
107568
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
During its thirty-five years, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) has been scarred by treaty violations, failed compliance negotiations, and ambiguous treaty language. Essentially a bruised paper tiger, the BWC adds no clarification to its distinction between biological activities for peaceful versus hostile purposes and has amplified-rather than lessened-mistrust in states' biological research and development potential. For the past two decades, these circumstances have generated multilateral annual discussions on BWC issues. From 2003 to 2010, intersessional talks centered on less controversial topics in an attempt to save the treaty from spiraling political tensions. States generally agree that this intersessional process was not futile and that it cooled some of the negative effects of the failed negotiations over a compliance protocol. At the upcoming Seventh BWC Review Conference this December, treaty members will weigh the utility of extending the process and its accompanying administrative Implementation Support Unit. The challenge will be to stimulate the evolution of the BWC beyond its hollow characterization to strengthen and inspire confidence in the treaty regime. This article examines the BWC's ambiguous language and how it has affected diplomacy, reflects on intersessional discussions, acknowledges the (limited) scope of appropriate peaceful activities that can be identified under the BWC, and addresses ways in which to reinvigorate the treaty.
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| 2 |
ID:
019709
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| Publication |
July-Aug 2001.
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| Description |
3-8
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| 3 |
ID:
107569
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) has continued along a path of slow evolution since the 2001 collapse of negotiations for a verification protocol for the treaty. Over the last ten years, two intersessional programs of work, along with the Sixth BWC Review Conference, have resulted in the establishment of practices and institutions that strengthen treaty implementation mechanisms. In addition, developments external to the BWC-such as the revitalization of the UN secretary-general's investigation mechanism-have increased the range of mechanisms available to states to address challenges posed by biological weapons. The authors argue that incremental enhancements to the BWC offer the best route forward for the treaty and for the wider biological weapons prohibition regime. The authors identify short-, medium-, and longer-term proposals for such enhancements.
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| 4 |
ID:
115584
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| 5 |
ID:
018164
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| Publication |
Sept 2000.
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| Description |
1-46
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| 6 |
ID:
069250
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| 7 |
ID:
115298
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Nonproliferation policies to prevent biological and chemical weapons use are important, but insufficient, particularly in view of the rise of global terrorism. Given the history of developing and using these weapons, it is crucial that governments properly prepare for biological and chemical threats, whether naturally occurring or man-made, such as by developing and managing effective healthcare infrastructure to mitigate widespread illness and injuries resulting from pandemics or terrorist attacks. Although the Middle East is one of the most sensitive and complex areas in the world-especially regarding regional arms control efforts and prevention-coordinating preparedness strategies among states in the region may be possible. Cooperatively addressing biological and chemical threats could lead to constructive progress towards the otherwise elusive goal of establishing a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East.
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| 8 |
ID:
023126
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| Publication |
Dec 21, 2002.
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| Description |
120-122
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| 9 |
ID:
019096
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| Publication |
2001.
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| Description |
215-225
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| 10 |
ID:
020629
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| Publication |
Dec 2001.
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| Description |
13-18
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| 11 |
ID:
053017
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| 12 |
ID:
058025
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| 13 |
ID:
061995
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| 14 |
ID:
001723
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| Publication |
Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic, 1998.
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| Description |
v.21 (xx, 222p.)
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| Standard Number |
0792352491
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Copies: C:2/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 041169 | 355.8245/GEI 041169 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
| 041170 | 355.8245/GEI 041170 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 15 |
ID:
107575
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article summarizes the conclusions of the articles comprising this special issue. The findings and recommendations of the contributing authors are organized according to the three questions that they were asked to address regarding the implications of the life sciences revolution for the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the appropriate venue to address various issues, and the steps needed to enhance the viability of the regime. For consideration at the Seventh BWC Review Conference and beyond, the contributing authors articulate an impressive number of pragmatic, constructive proposals to strengthen the norm against the misuse of biology and to reinforce the disarmament imperative that is embodied in the treaty.
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| 16 |
ID:
150333
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The states-parties to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) concluded the eighth review conference by adopting a final document that fell far short of what many sought and expected. Most of the participating countries viewed the results as a missed opportunity to advance measures to strengthen the legally binding accord that bans development, acquisition, and production of biological agents or toxins for possible weapons use.
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| 17 |
ID:
135249
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This article evaluates the security value of controls over biotechnology transfers and of new restrictions on the spread of scientific results: to what extent do they improve the implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention (bwc)? Although the questions of justice that have plagued the bwc regime since its creation in 1972 have been analyzed extensively, the effects of current controls over dual-use research and the propagation of scientific results on the implementation of the bwc have not been fully addressed. It is argued that although controls over biotechnology transfers increase security because they delay covert programs by creating integration challenges, controls on the spread of scientific results have no security value. They instead may lead to a decreased implementation of the bwc.
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| 18 |
ID:
105108
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| 19 |
ID:
107567
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This introductory article first provides an overview of key historical developments pertaining to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), exposing the roots of the assertion that the treaty is unverifiable. The article also reviews the factors that have changed since the BWC's negotiation, including those that loom over the BWC's effective implementation today, with special emphasis on the challenges posed by the advancement and global diffusion of life sciences know-how, technologies, equipment, and capabilities. The narrative concludes with a description of the methodology behind this special issue of the Nonproliferation Review, introducing the contributing authors and the common questions they address in the context of their topics.
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| 20 |
ID:
021190
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| Publication |
Spring 2002.
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| Description |
17-30
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