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| 1 |
ID:
147092
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study analyzed the Collective Action for the Mobility Program of University Students in Asia (CAMPUS Asia) program, whose initiation in the Northeast Asia region was agreed upon for political reasons by the leaders of the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan, and China. The program is significant due to the current rapid marketization of East Asia’s higher education exchange. Accordingly, this study examines CAMPUS Asia as a top-down exchange and explains how the program enables the institutionalization of a trilateral relationship, promotion of mutual understanding, and identity change. It is hoped that the utilization of one-on-one interviews with participant students in particular will enhance the academic contribution of the paper. Moreover, the conclusion explains the current issues of political instability and imbalanced participation the program faces, and suggests measures to overcome these issues. Through this discussion, it is expected that a vision will be produced whereby the CAMPUS Asia program will go beyond its current pilot phase and develop into a stable program.
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| 2 |
ID:
147094
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In 2007, the European Union (EU) and the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) started interregional negotiations on a free trade agreement, which failed 2 years later. Relying on document analysis and elite interviews with officials from the EU and ASEAN’s members, this article addresses why and the extent to which the interregional negotiations failed. By rooting the theoretical model in a power-based approach, the analysis demonstrates that the EU has attempted to secure its economic and regulatory power in Southeast Asia. In striving for such power, interregionalism was initially the intuitive way because the EU perceived ASEAN as a cohesive bloc. However, the EU’s ambitious vision for comprehensive agreements clashed with the actual heterogeneity of ASEAN member states. The failure of the interregional approach is, thus, a result of the EU’s delicate balance between political and economic interests in Southeast Asia, which it pursues with trade-specific issues.
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| 3 |
ID:
147095
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Since 2004, the EU has created 11 EU centers and two center-modeled programs in East Asia as an integral part of its public diplomacy in order to “promote the study, understanding, and support of the EU and its policies.” All of these centers were jointly established by the EU and local universities, and more than 50 % of their funding is offered by the EU institutions. Among these centers and programs, the EU Center in Taiwan (EUTW) distinguishes itself from the others in two ways. On one hand, similar to the EU Center in Singapore, it acts as a national center rather than a university center. On the other hand, it was jointly inaugurated by a consortium of seven universities rather than one or two universities across the island. Therefore, this paper aims to evaluate the EU public diplomacy in Asia with the help of soft power theory and an in-depth case study of the EUTW. I will firstly review the development of the EU Studies and EU-related communities in Taiwan before the EUTW was formally inaugurated in May 2009. In the second part, I will present an in-depth analysis of the structure and functioning of the EUTW in terms of EU public diplomacy on the island. In the third part, the work of EUTW in the promotion of study, understanding, and even support of the EU and its policies will be evaluated with help of an institutionalist framework. In the end, I will give a balance sheet of the EUTW in terms of EU public diplomacy before drawing into some conclusions.
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| 4 |
ID:
147090
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| Summary/Abstract |
To what extent can we speak of a distinctively ‘European’ security approach towards the Asia-Pacific region? In order to address that timely question, this article examines how Britain, France, Germany and the European Union (EU) are framing their evolving security roles in the Asia-Pacific region, and how those individual perspectives intersect with each other. The article identifies a number of important common features in Europe’s approaches towards security in the Asia-Pacific, namely the tendency of most European actors to emphasize the economic and diplomatic nature of their contribution to regional security, their promotion of regional multilateral security fora, their rejection of the notion that China’s rise is inherently challenging for regional and global security, and their willingness to signal their differences towards Washington’s emphasis on military power and alliance-based approach. However, and despite the existence of common traits, individual European actors show different degrees of closeness vis-à-vis the US and China and feature different perspectives regarding which security relationships they should prioritize in the region (if any), or the appropriate balance between diplomacy and security and defence cooperation. Such divergences prevent Europeans from developing a coherent security profile in the region and preclude us from speaking of a distinctively European security approach towards the Asia-Pacific.
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| 5 |
ID:
147093
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| Summary/Abstract |
Consolidation of the “Common European Market” is a key feature of the European Union, which is made possible by the freedom in movement of goods, capital, services, and people. The freedom of movement for businesses manifests itself as the right of establishment. The aim of this paper is to examine various issues surrounding the right of establishment and to analyze the position of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in each case. The analysis of cases illustrates a consistent opinion of the ECJ: The right of establishment is highly protected, but it must be exercised in the context of national legislation. Government regulation in market access, on the other hand, must meet the imperative requirement doctrine: it must be non-discriminatory, there must be general public interest at stake, the regulation must be an effective means of promoting public interest, and the regulation must be necessary and proportional to the general interest at stake. In sum, the ECJ upholds the right of establishment but nonetheless respects the states’ specific regulatory authority as long as they conform to the imperative requirement doctrine.
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| 6 |
ID:
147091
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite the several chances of agreement, Japan and Russia have failed to solve the dispute over the Northern Territories/South Kuril Islands. The 1956 model seems to be the most plausible method, but the lack of political coherence of the central politics and the will of negotiation became the factors that hinder the two countries from reaching an agreement. By reviewing the conflicting footprints and strategies of the two countries, the authors argue that the more democratized and diffused a political system is, the more difficult it is to come to an agreement in negotiations. This intensifies the existing theory of foreign policy decision-making process emphasizing the influence of domestic constituents.
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