| Summary/Abstract |
North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test in January 2016. It seemed to nullify Sunshine Policy, the policy idea that South Korea’s economic assistance can induce North Korea’s post-communist reform and opening, and, in turn, promote interKorean peace. The primary purpose of this article is to identify the structural causes of the failure of these inducement policies, while seeking potential remedies. The argument is that South Korean assistance policies have not managed to effectively accomplish the intended outcomes because of the patrimonial domination of North Korean rent-seeking elites and the under-provision of policy harmonization among engaged donors. First, the patrimonial domination, substantially free of institutions of accountability, matters. Second, the lack of international harmonization among engaged donors’ policy goals decreases aid effectiveness, which seems to worsen the problem of politicized aid. In the event that North Korea changes its policy directions to meet the international demands of denuclearization, this article suggests the institutionalization of a multinational consortium to promote policy harmonization among engaged donors and to lower the structural impediments raised by the North Korean ancien régime as well.
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