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ID:
146173
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the early 2000s, the United States Air Force Intelligence Community attempted to adopt and institutionalize a new concept called Predictive Battlespace Awareness (PBA). An alluring concept for senior leaders, PBA would presumably provide predictive, actionable intelligence to combat decisionmakers. The concept was integrated into Air Force publications and intelligence training programs. Leaders across the Air Force were mentored to praise its value. The acquisition community embraced the concept as a key threshold to determine the investment worthiness of future and existing programs.
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| 2 |
ID:
146174
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| Summary/Abstract |
Comparative analyses of non-Western intelligence communities have been relatively few. Those that exist have tended to involve the United States as a baseline for comparison. In fact, Intelligence Studies as an academic discipline has been so dominated by American and English perspectives and conceptualizations that the informal term “Anglosphere” has emerged. Moreover, most non-American investigations of intelligence, whether comparative or single case studies, tend to be anecdotal and largely historical. And even these tend to be pushed through the lens of Western intelligence definitions and concepts. Very little exists—at least in English translation—that tries to examine the intelligence cultures of non-Western intelligence communities from their own political perspectives and national security priorities.
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| 3 |
ID:
146171
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| Summary/Abstract |
Double agents are a special breed of people. They pretend to spy for one foreign intelligence service while actually spying for another. All intelligence services fall victim to such deception from time to time. It's all part of the “wilderness of mirrors” in spy wars where illusion and reality coexist and confound. Former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Richard Helms once told Congress that detecting a double-agent operation is “one of the most difficult and tricky aspects of intelligence work, and there isn't anybody who's been in it very long who hasn't been tricked once, twice, maybe many times.”
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| 4 |
ID:
146176
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| Summary/Abstract |
The consequences of the latest world financial and economic crisis have become quite apparent. Spain and the Spanish people are suffering the impact of both a lack of confidence in the international markets and a diminished access to finance mechanisms. To affirm that the economy is a transverse factor that determines in a direct and indirect way a country's alternatives in other matters and is key to a state's safety and well-being is saying nothing new. Accommodating the country's national intelligence structures to permit a suitable response to this increasing financial threat is an important challenge.
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| 5 |
ID:
146172
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| Summary/Abstract |
Most people have never heard of the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) A-12 OXCART aircraft, and many would have difficulty differentiating it from an Air Force SR-71 Blackbird. Though similar, the A-12 was by many accounts more capable than its famous cousin. Yet, in December 1966, the A-12 was cancelled, not the SR-71. With that cancellation, the United States essentially lost its ability to conduct covert, non-military aerial reconnaissance.1 The main reason scholars and the public know so little about the A-12 is that many details of the program remained classified until 2007, and some documents until as recently as August 2013. Newly-declassified documents on the A-12, SR-71, and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) help fill a significant gap in the literature on the cause of the A-12's cancellation. But the question remains: Why did President Lyndon B. Johnson cancel the A-12 program in December 1966?
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| 6 |
ID:
146177
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| Summary/Abstract |
June 1961. Bill and I had separate rooms at the Embajador Hotel. On the eighth floor, each had a balcony overlooking the city. After our second day in the Dominican Republic—after Eve clued us in to the assassination—Bill and I generally went to the balcony of my room to watch the city to see any sign of Johnny Abbes and his Servicio Intelligencia Militar (SIM) hunting for Rafael Trujillo's assassins, who had killed the president on 30 May.
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| 7 |
ID:
146170
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| Summary/Abstract |
The relationship between the press and the Intelligence Community (IC) in the United States has long been a subject of debate.1 The press alternately has been labeled a collaborator and enabler of U.S. intelligence by previously allowing Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) personnel to pose as journalists and by keeping information about the CIA from the public. It has also been accused of undermining the activities of the IC and endangering U.S. national security by exposing ongoing operations, wrongdoing, scandals, and failures, as well as by publishing secrets. Today, still another relationship is emerging: the press as an independent instrument of oversight.
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| 8 |
ID:
146175
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| Summary/Abstract |
The quote setting the stage for this report is from U.S. Army Air Corps Colonel Hubert Zemke, one of the many World War II prisoners interrogated by Hanns Joachim Scharff (1907–1992). Scharff worked at the German Luftwaffe's Intelligence and Evaluation Center (Auswertestelle West), where he interrogated over 500 American and British fighter pilots.
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| 9 |
ID:
146169
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| Summary/Abstract |
Good diplomacy goes hand-in-hand with good intelligence. Just as courtroom lawyers never ask a question to which they do not already know the answer, so too should politicians and diplomats avoid negotiating with enemies without first understanding what they bring to the table and what they seek to conceal. Because rogue regimes are among America's most opaque and dangerous adversaries,1 a breakthrough in relations can define a President's legacy and make diplomats’ careers. Too often, the temptation to succeed can be overwhelming. When intelligence clashes with political and diplomatic goals, the sanctity of intelligence often loses: seldom do Presidents want their diplomatic initiatives to be the sacrifice.
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