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ID:
147538
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| Summary/Abstract |
In recent years, the “China model” of development has been proposed and promoted. Some proponents of the China model even suggest that there emerges a “Beijing Consensus” which has a high possibility of replacing the Washington Consensus. This article argues that there exist at least two China models, which have contrasting features with distinctive roles played by entrepreneurs within China’s local governments. In the earlier years of the reform era, the role of market was expanding, and local governments mainly played an enabling role in facilitating the growth of non-state sectors and in following the demand-driven growth path to expand local tax bases under the revenue-sharing system. After 1998 onwards, the current government-led investment-driven development model gradually emerged with local governments’ focus evidently shifting towards rent-seeking and monopolising financial resources for their own investment projects. The article discusses the incentive compatibility issues associated with local governments under the two China models and documents in detail local governments’ entrepreneurship in investment financing.
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| 2 |
ID:
161973
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| Summary/Abstract |
How China’s “new normal” affects the conduct of monetary policy deserves a careful study. The enormous task of economic restructuring, amid conflicting goals, has certainly introduced a new set of challenges to macroeconomic management. This article provides empirical evidence to show that the conduct of China’s monetary policy has indeed changed and become less predictable since 2013. While supply-side structural adjustments significantly decrease local governments’ appetite for investment and create slacks in aggregate demand, macroeconomic policymakers feel compelled to ease off deleveraging pressures when the adjustment pains are considered unbearable. The monetary authority also faces the policy trilemma when the internationalisation of the renminbi requires a strong currency and free flow of capital. Furthermore, the dual-track interest rate system creates speculative capital movements between bank deposits and the money market which complicates the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Inconsistencies are thus created, and reversals of policy direction are frequently observed.
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| 3 |
ID:
147537
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| Summary/Abstract |
While local government entrepreneurship has long been regarded as one of the main drivers of China’s economic growth, it has increasingly been recognised as a potential source of a set of harmful policy consequences in recent years, such as rising government debt crises, pervasive corruption and environmental degradation. These criticisms have prompted questions about what types of entrepreneurship might be more desirable, and which incentive structures might be necessary to pave the way for the right kind of local government entrepreneurship. The articles in this special issue focus on new developments in local government entrepreneurship from a public policy perspective. Collectively, they explore the normative dimensions of local government entrepreneurship in China, with an emphasis on necessary policy changes to shape local government entrepreneurship in contributing to economic growth as well as other key policy objectives.
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