| Summary/Abstract |
Making use of recently declassified documents, in this article I examine the U.S. government’s perceptions about Shi’a Islam during the time of the Iranian revolution, 1978–9. I show how lower ranking officials in diplomatic and intelligence circles came to the common conception of Shi’ism as being a uniquely populist religion with an inherent propensity towards revolutionary instability, as demonstrated in its doctrines, rituals and history. These perceptions influenced higher levels of government, including President Carter himself. I then explore how analysts and policymakers conceptualized the religious leadership in Iran, especially Khomeini. I show that although opinion was divided about whether Khomeini represented U.S. interests, the prevailing view was to oppose him because of his populist tendencies empowering the Iranian masses, which senior policymakers had come to see as integral to Shi’ism itself. As a result, I argue, although the wider Cold War context dictated the U.S. government’s attempt to maintain diplomatic relations with the new Iranian regime in 1979, this was to be done without overtures to Khomeini, long before the Hostage Crisis.
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